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INTRODUCTION
The United States became a party to the Berne Convention in
1989. Article 6bis of the Convention requires member nations to
protect an author's rights of attribution and integrity; two of the
generally recognized moral rights.' Article 6bis states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after
the transfer of said rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.2
I CRAIG JOYCE, MARSHALL LEAFFER, PETER JASZI & TYLER OCHOA, COPYRIGHT
LAW 573, 577 (8th ed. 2011). These are "the two most prominently recognized moral
rights." Lior Zemer, Moral Rights: Limited Edition, 91 B.U.L. Rev. 1519, 1524 (2011).
See generally Susan Liemer, On the Origins of Le Droit Moral: How Non-Economic
Rights Came to be Protected by French IP Law, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 65 (2012).
2 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis,
Mar. 1, 1989, 102 Stat. 2853 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Berne Convention is
an international copyright treaty, adopted in Berne Switzerland in 1886, providing
that works created by the citizens of one signatory country will be fully protected in
other signatory countries without the need to comply with local formalities such as
registration and deposit. Victor Hugo was a moving force behind this treaty. Phillips v.
Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 133 n.3 (1st Cir. 2006).
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The protection of these and other moral rights is said to help
encourage the creation of art. These rights are "of a spiritual, non-
economic and personal nature," they exist "independently of an
artist's copyright in his or her work," and they "spring from a
belief that an artist in the process of creation injects his spirit into
the work and that the artist's personality, as well as the integrity
of the work, should therefore be protected and preserved."3 They
"protect the author's personality rights in his work."4
The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)5 was enacted by
Congress in 1990 in order to bring our laws into compliance with
Article 6bis,6 and to acknowledge that protecting these rights will
foster "a climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages the
author in the arduous act of creation."7 The passage of this
legislation is said to show Congress's "belief that the art covered
by the Act 'meet[s] a special societal need, and [its] protection and
preservation serves an important public interest."'8
Notwithstanding these lofty statements about artistic worth,
honor and encouraging creation,9 VARA is a narrowly drafted
addition to the Copyright Act. This legislation recognized several
3 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).
4 Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations: A Property-Law Framework
for the Protection of Authors' Moral Rights, 69 TUL. L. REV. 935, 938 (1995). See also
Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors
and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940) ("When an artist creates, be he an
author, a painter, a sculptor, an architect or a musician, he does more than bring into
the world a unique object having only exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world
part of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use. There are
possibilities of injury to the creator other than merely economic ones."). See generally
Jeanne Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745,
1753-57 (2012); Zemer, supra note 1, at 1523-25.
5 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
6 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 577. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, that altered aspects of U.S. copyright law for Berne compliance, had taken a
"minimalist" approach on moral rights and did not touch this field. Id. at 573.
7 HOUSE REPORT ON THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 101-
514, at 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915) [hereinafter H. REP. with
cites to U.S.C.C.A.N. pagination].
8 Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 49 (1st Cir.
2010) (quoting H. REP., supra note 7, at 6915-16). Moral rights laws "give artists the
right to prevent purchasers of their works from altering those works, even after the
purchase is complete, if the artist disapproves of the alterations." Brian Angelo Lee,
Making Sense of Moral Rights' in Intellectual Property, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 71, 71 (2011).
9 See Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 270 (2009) (quoting
members of Congress about the justifications for enacting VARA).
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moral rights in the United States for the first time,10 but it does
not extend to all works of authorship. It protects only a very select
group of artists and only very narrowly defined works." Enacted
over twenty years ago, VARA may have initially fulfilled our
nation's obligations under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention,
even though it provides less protection than most European moral
rights legislation. 12 It has been called weak, anemic and
insufficient. 13 As interpreted and applied by the courts since 1991,
it is now reasonable to conclude that VARA has not come close to
fulfilling our obligations under Article 6bis. The federal judiciary,
at both the trial and appellate levels, has taken seriously the
statute's restrictive language, its explicit exclusions from
coverage, and the legislative history's emphasis on VARA's limited
scope. 14 In addition, severe tensions between artists' moral rights
10 Several states had enacted moral rights statutes prior to the enactment of
VARA. Lee, supra note 8, at 79-80; Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Author's Rights-Based
Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24
CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 598 (2006).
11 Dana Burton, Artists' Moral Rights: Controversy and the Visual Artists Rights
Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 639, 642 (1995).
12 Ciolino, supra note 4, at 956. It has been asserted that VARA was enacted
merely for the limited purpose of bringing U.S. law closer to compliance with the Berne
Convention. Lee, supra note 8, at 74 n.7 (quoting ROGER SCHECHTER & JOHN THOMAS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 139
(2003) ("Doubts nevertheless persisted over whether the United States had fully met
its Berne Convention obligations. Congress responded by enacting [VARA].")); Edward
Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral
Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 946 (1990) (noting the
sentiment at the time of adoption that the legislation did not comply with the Berne
Convention); Jacquelin Lipton, Moral Rights and Supernatural Fiction: Authorial
Dignity and the New Moral Rights Agenda, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP MEDIA & ENT.
L.J., 537, 539, 577 (2011) (stating that VARA fell short of bringing the U.S. into
compliance with 6bis and that the U.S. may not be in a position to comply with Berne
obligations consistent with our Constitution).
13 Bernard J. Pazanowski, Controversy Over Football-Field-Sized Exhibit Supports
Artist's VARA Suit Against Museum, 78 U.S.L.W. 1469 (Feb. 9, 2010) (quoting Ray
Dowd, author of COPYRIGHT LITIGATION HANDBOOK); Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights:
Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 407, 452 (2009).
14 Adler, supra note 9, at 268; Lindsey Mills, Moral Rights: Well-Intentioned
Protection and Its Unintended Consequences, 90 TEX. L. REV. 443 (2011) (noting that
moral rights defenders say the statute provides little protection for too few artists, that
waivers cut back on that protection, and that the courts have under enforced VARA);
Monica Pa & Christopher Robinson, Recent Developments in the Visual Artists Rights
Act, LANDSLIDE, Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 22-23 [hereinafter Pa & Robinson]; Zemer, supra
note 1, at 1527.
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and defendants' rights, particularly property rights, have been
palpable in many of the cases brought under VARA. As a
consequence, courts have shown great reluctance to permit an
artist's moral rights to prevail over a defendant's rights.15
Successful reported VARA claims seem to be few and far between.
This article, after summarizing VARA's provisions, presents
a pre-VARA moral rights case that might come out much
differently if it were litigated today. This hypothetical case
highlights many of the issues raised by VARA. Subsequent
sections of the article analyze the act's narrow definition of works
of visual art as well as its several limitations on the attribution
and integrity rights. These are the key provisions which have been
interpreted by the courts since VARA's passage in 1990. Time
after time the courts have applied this narrowly drawn statute to
deny plausible moral rights claims asserted by visual artists.
An important theme of this article is the concept, "get it in
writing." Notwithstanding the challenges of winning a VARA
claim, the possibility of expensive and time consuming litigation
should cause individuals and organizations who are considering
purchasing or commissioning a work of visual art that comes
within the scope of VARA to look at the statute's provisions on
waiver in sections 106A(e)(1) and 113(d) and then bargain with
the artist for an explicit waiver of his or her moral rights. Waivers
are especially important in regard to works of visual art that are
incorporated in a building, and for works of visual art which are
site specific or integrated in their surroundings. After all, today's
highly acclaimed sculptural work on display in the grand hall of a
municipality's convention center might become tomorrow's white
elephant, and the decision to remove that work could result in a
VARA claim by the sculptor absent waiver.
15 Pa & Robinson, supra note 14, at 23. Cf. Robert Gorman, Federal Moral Rights
Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14 NOVA L. REV. 421, 422 (1990). The number of
reported VARA cases is exceeded by the number of scholarly works about moral rights.
Robert Bird, Of Geese, Ribbons and Creative Destruction: Moral Right and Its
Consequences, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 63, 64 (2011).
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF VARA
VARA does not afford protection to all works of authorship.
To the contrary, it is limited to "works of visual art." These works
are defined in section 101 of the Copyright Act as:
[A] painting, drawing, print, or sculpture existing in a single
copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are
signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the
case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved or fabricated
sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by
the author and bear the signature of other identifying mark of
the author.
Photographs are included too. They are defined as: "[A] still
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author."16
The definition excludes motions pictures, audiovisual works,
books, magazines, electronic publications, and advertising or
promotional materials. Works made for hire are also excluded, as
are works not subject to copyright protection.17 "Thus, VARA
establishe[s] a new and distinct genus of art: 'work[s] of visual
art,' which differs in many respects from the pre-existing
categories in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act."18
16 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). "The statute's limitation to 'still' photographic images is
intended to ensure that 'moving' images . . . are not protected under the bill. The
limited approach of the bill precludes coverage of all photographs. Thus the bill both
narrowly defines the kinds of photographs covered and . . . specifically denies
protection to others." H. REP., supra note 7, at 6921. Still, it encompasses a wide range
of works including positives and negatives, prints, contact sheets, and slides. Id. A
significant impact of the "200 copies or fewer" limitation on the several works of visual
art is that works intended for reproduction beyond those limits are outside of VARA's
protections. Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, Inc., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489, 1494
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
17 17 U.S.C. § 101. See, e.g., Kamanou v. Exec. Sec'y of the Comm'n. on Econ. Cmty.
in W. Africa, No. 10 Civ. 7286(GBD)(JLC), 2012 WL 162708, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,
2012) (holding the west African poverty profile written by the plaintiff, as an employee
of the UN Statistics Division, is a work for hire and not under VARA).
18 Lilly v. Stout, 384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting 3-8D MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.06(A)(1) (2004) [hereinafter
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]). See also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Films, 539
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According to VARA's legislative history, "courts should use
common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic
community in determining whether a particular work falls within
the scope of the definition."1 9 VARA's drafters recognized that
artists work in a variety of media and use many different
materials, so whether a particular work falls within the definition
should not depend on the medium or materials used.20 For
example, the legislative history states that "[t]he term 'sculpture'
includes, but is not limited to, castings, carvings, modelings, and
constructions." 21 Given the definition and its exclusions, as well as
the legislative history, it is not surprising that courts have had to
grapple with whether VARA reaches unfinished installations,
relatively permanent floral displays, a sculptural work with four
separate but interrelated elements, art incorporated into a
building, graffiti, and site-specific art.2 2
U.S. 23, 24 (2003) (noting that VARA is carefully limited to and focused on works of
visual art).
19 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6921.
20 Id. "[T]he term 'painting' includes murals, works created on canvas, and the
like." Id. One commentator has argued that the definition covers tattoos. Christine
Lesicko, Tattoos as Visual Art: How Body Art Fits into the Visual Artists Rights Act, 53
IDEA 39, 50-51 (2013). Another author has considered whether VARA can extend to the
electronic world of Second Life. Nathan Brown, VARA Rights Get a Second Life, 11 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 280 (2011). Some scholars doubt that graffiti can be protected. Jamison
Davies, Art Crimes?: Theoretical Perspectives on Copyright Protection for Illegally-
Created Graffiti Art, 65 ME. L. REV. 27, 43-44 (2013).
21 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6921. For example, courts have held that "sculpture"
encompasses a large walk through installation which filled up most of a building's
lobby and a massive installation that covered most of an exhibition space the size of a
football field. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1995); Mass.
Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 48 n.7 (1st Cir.
2010).
22 Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011); Buchel, 593 F.3d at 38;
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2006); Cohen v. G & M Realty
L.P., No. 13-CV-5612 (FB)(JMA), 2013 WL 6172732 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013) (VARA
did not give court authority to preserve abandoned building decorated with graffiti art);
Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of N.Y., No. 01 Civ. 1226 DAB, 2003
WL 21403333 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003); Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Ams. Assocs., 901 F.
Supp. 620, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See also Jackson v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., No.
11-4023-CV-C-MJW, 2011 WL 5838432, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2011) (plaintiffs
mosaic of glass tiles with the University's symbol and tiger mascot might be a work of
visual art protected by VARA). It is not clear if VARA applies to conceptual art such as
the work of Dadaists like Marcel Duchamp, or to works like Andy Warhol's bulk
ketchup box. Nathan Davis, As Good As New: Conserving Artwork and the Destruction
of Moral Rights, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 223-24 (2011).
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VARA grants three moral rights to the creators of qualifying
works of visual art. These rights are subject to fair use. 2 3 The
right of 'integrity' gives the artist "the right . .. to prevent an
intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation,
and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that
work is a violation of that right."2 4 Under the right of paternity or
attribution, the artist can insist that his work be attributed to
him, that works created by someone else not be misattributed to
him, and to prevent the use of his or her name as the artist in the
event a distortion or modification of the work would be prejudicial
to his or her honor or reputation.25 In respect to works of
recognized stature, the artist has the right to prevent
destruction.26 In addition, there is a special provision concerning
the rights of artists whose works have been incorporated in a
building. This provision-the so called "buildings exception" or
real estate waiver-distinguishes between removable and non-
removable works of visual art.2 7
The integrity and attribution rights are standard in moral
right statutes but the right to prevent destruction is not
universal.28 Many countries also give artists a disclosure right
23 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) ("Subject to section 107 and independent of the rights
provided in section 106."). See Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in
Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795, 814 (2001).
24 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
25 Id. § 106A(a)(1), (2).
26 Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B). By providing for a right of attribution and by protecting
against both mutilation and destruction, the statute followed the preservation model
enacted by some states in moral rights statutes. This model recognizes that destruction
of art hurts society as well as the artist. In essence, the most effective way to protect
works is by giving the artist the right of integrity and the power to enforce it. H. REP.,
supra note 7, at 6926. It is not clear that the destruction of a work falls within Article
6bis(1)-in other words, whether the Berne Convention requires this right. Lipton,
supra note 12, at 546; see also Piotraut, supra note 10, at 600 (asserting that the U.S.
seems to satisfy the requirements of 6bis with respect to the attribution and integrity
rights).
27 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1), (2); Keith Attlesey, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990:
The Art of Preserving Building Owner's Rights, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 371, 385
(1992); Francesca Garson, Before That Artist Came Along, It Was Just a Bridge: The
Visual Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site Specific Artwork, 11 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 203, 206 (2001); Pa & Robinson, supra note 14, at 25.
28 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6925 n.26; see also Amy Adler, supra note 9, at 267 &
n.17 (2009); Lipton, supra note 12, at 546; cf. Piotraut, supra note 10, at 603-04
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which is the right to determine when and whether his or her work
of visual art is completed and ready to be shown. 29 A few countries
also recognize a right of withdrawal, and in some there is a right
to be free of excessive criticism. 3 0
The artist has the burden of proof to show that his or her
work comes within the definition,3' and then to establish that the
defendant's action in regard to that work are "prejudicial to his or
her honor or reputation."32 This standard imposes some
limitations, but the "formulation for determining whether harm to
honor or reputation exists must of necessity be flexible" and expert
testimony is permissible.33
The rights under VARA exist independently of the artist's
copyright in a work of visual art and endure for the life of the
artist.34 They are distinct from ownership of any particular copy of
the work. A transfer of a copyright, or the transfer of a copy of the
(discussing French cases in which the destruction or removal of works violated the
integrity right). Kenneth Snelson, a widely known and well regarded artist, provided
VARA's drafters with a compelling example of the need for the right to prevent
destruction. As an unknown artist his first major commission was two sculptural
towers he created in the early 1960s that he sold to the New York World's Fair. At the
conclusion of the fair, the towers were sold for scrap metal without Snelson's
knowledge. If VARA had been law at that time, his works might have been protected
against destruction even though he was relatively unknown. H. REP., supra note 7, at
6926.
29 VARA does not provide for a disclosure right, also called the right of divulgation.
Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 62 (1st Cir. 2010).
3o JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 573. See also Ciolino, supra note 4, at 942. It is
reasonable to regard the right to prevent destruction as a subset of the integrity right
and conclude that VARA created two exclusive rights-attribution and integrity. Pa &
Robinson, supra note 14, at 22.
31 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6923. See, e.g., Lilley v. Stout, 384 F. Supp. 2d 83
(D.D.C. 2005) (photographer's claim that defendant incorporated her photo in a
painting without attribution dismissed because the plaintiff could not show that her
photos were for exhibition purposes only); Kamanou v. Exec. Sec'y of the Comm'n of the
Econ. Cmty. of W. African States, No. 10 Civ. 7286(GBD)(JLC), 2012 WL 162708, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012) (plaintiff unable to bring her publication profiling poverty
within VARA because it was a work for hire and it was not a work of visual art).
32 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6925-26.
33 Id.
34 "Subject to section 107 and independent of the exclusive rights provided in
section 106, the author of a work of visual art - (1) shall have the right." 17 U.S.C. §
106A(a) (2012); see also § 106A(e)(2). The duration provision is section 106A(d). The life
of the artist term is for works created on or after VARA's effective date - (d)(1) - while
works created before that date enjoy the standard copyright term - (d)(2).
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work of art, is not a waiver of the artist's moral rights.35 Since
these rights are considered an extension of the artist's personality,
they cannot be transferred.36 However, these rights can be waived
if the artist "expressly agrees to such waiver in a written
instrument" he or she signs that specifies the exact terms of the
waiver.37 The "buildings exception" also contains a similar waiver
provision.38 Whether Article 6bis allows waivers is not certain but
the United States is not alone in permitting them even though
VARA prohibits transfers. 39 VARA can apply to works created
before its effective date of June 1, 1991,40 but it exempts
infringements of the attribution and integrity rights which
occurred before that date.41 The legislation was not retroactive so
the continued display of a work that was modified before VARA
became effective is not an actionable distortion, mutilation or
display. 42
This brief summary of VARA underscores its limited scope. 43
Lobbyists for the real estate and publishing industries argued
against expansive moral rights protections out of fear that an
artist could hold a property owner hostage once his or her work of
visual art was installed in a building.44 There is no doubt that
3 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2).
36 Id. § 106A(e)(1); see also supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
7 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
38 Id. § 113(d)(1)(B).
3 Lipton, supra note 12, at 548-49
40 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(2); Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Ams. Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620,
628 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (VARA applies to sculptural work created in 1963). See also Kelley
v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011) (litigation concerned the modification of
a massive floral exhibit planted in 1984); Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v.
City of New York., No. 01 Civ. 1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003)
(VARA claim regarding the removal of artwork installed on the side of a building in the
early 1970s).
41 Pavia, 901 F. Supp. at 628.
42 Id. at 629.
43 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 589; cf. Speaking of Moral Rights: A Conversation
Between Eva E. Subotnik and Jane C. Ginsburg, 30 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 91, 94-
95 (2012) (discussing the very limited nature of VARA's attribution right since this
right is tied to the act's very limited definition of 'work of visual art').
4 See Ciolino, supra note 4, at 957 (listing several reasons for disfavoring moral
rights); Garson, supra note 27, at 206 ("[T]o ensure that real estate remained alienable
Congress added the real estate waiver to VARA[-section 113(d)]."); Lee, supra note 23,
at 814 ("Perhaps most jarring to the American psyche is the idea of an author's moral
right taking precedence over another's property right."); Lipton, supra note 12, at 560-
61; Pa & Robinson, supra note 14, at 22; Zemer, supra note 1, at 1525 (noting
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Congress's intent was to limit VARA's application.45 This is
emphasized in the statute's legislative history. The definition of a
work of visual art is a critical underpinning of the limited scope of
the bill. As Representative Markey testified, "I would like to stress
that we have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the
works of art that will be covered ... [T]his legislation covers only a
very select group of artists."46
"[TIhe congressional debate 'revealed a consensus that the
bill's scope should be limited to certain carefully defined types of
works and artists, and that if claims arising in other contexts are
to be considered, they must be considered separately.'"4 7 "Because
of its limited nature, H.R. 2690 protects the legitimate interests of
visual artists without undue interference with the successful
operation of the American copyright system."48
II. BEFORE AND AFTER: A PRE-VARA DISPUTE
BECOMES A POST-VARA HYPOTHETICAL
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church,49 a New York decision
from 1949, presents a stark conflict between moral rights and
property rights, and illustrates how the enactment of VARA
sharpens this conflict. Alfred Crimi was a well-known muralist
opposition by the copyright industries). One commentator denounced the new statute
as "an exotic legal import" that "represents an unprecedented incursion on property
rights as Americans know them." George C. Smith, Artistic License Takes on a New
Meaning, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 17, 1990, at 23. Another commentator said this was
classic special-interest legislation, regulating the ability of an owner to do
with her property, as she likes, not so much for the benefit of artists or
filmmakers as such, but for the benefit of a minority who will feel better
knowing that the owner is not allowed to act in an uncultured way.
Stephen L. Carter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 101
(1990). Cf. Gorman, supra note 15, at 422.
45 Cheffins v. Stewart, No. 3:09-cv-00130-RAM, 2011 WL 1233378, at *3 (D. Nev.
Mar. 29, 2011).
6 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6920-21 (emphasis added).
47 Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing H.
REP., supra note 7, at 6919).
48 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6920 (emphasis added). There was fear that these
moral rights "might hamper commerce or unduly impose on other property ownership
rights." Davis, supra note 22, at 221. See generally Zemer, supra note 1, at 1526-27
(summarizing problems with VARA and its limited scope).
49 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949).
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who was paid $6,800 in 1938 to paint a large fresco on the rear
wall of a church. He assigned his copyright to the church. Some
members of the congregation did not care for the artist's portrayal
of a bare-chested Jesus, and eight years after Crimi completed the
fresco, the church painted it over without giving him notice. Crimi
sued the church seeking, in the alternative, restoration of the
fresco, its removal from the building, or damages. The church won
because the artist had failed to reserve any rights.50 He asserted a
moral rights claim but the court noted that moral rights had not
yet been accepted in the United States and that it was not about
to make new law.5 1
What might happen if Crimi was litigated today?5 2 Let's
assume that the fresco is painted on the church's wall in 2009 and
that the muralist assigned his copyright to the church.
Notwithstanding several limitations in VARA on what can be
protected as a work of visual art,53 this fresco would qualify. 54 If
the artist has advance notice of the church's plans he could try to
enjoin the removal or other alteration of the fresco because the act
gives him the right to "prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation or other modification" of the work that would hurt his
honor or reputation, and also the right "to prevent any destruction
of a work of recognized stature."55 VARA does not define
''recognized statute" so this requirement could be a hurdle for the
muralist,5 6 but it is reasonable to assume that Crimi's fresco
50 Id. at 814-15, 818; see also RALPH BROWN & ROBERT DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT:
UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND RELATED ToPIcs BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKS
OF AUTHORSHIP 734 (7th ed. 1998).
5' Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 818. If he wanted to retain rights in his fresco, he should
have done so in a contract. See generally Matthew Goodin, The Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990: Further Defining the Rights and Duties of Artists and Real Property
Owners, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (1992).
52 BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 50, at 734; cf Piotraut, supra note 10, at 603-04
(discussing a French decision condemning the removal of an artistic fountain set up in
a shopping mall as being analogous to the removal of a work incorporated in a
building).
53 See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
54 A "work of visual art" is "a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a
single copy." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). A case interpreting California's moral rights
statute held that murals are not protected, but according to VARA's legislative history,
it clearly encompasses murals. H. REP., supra note 7, at 6921.
55 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B).
6 See infra notes 187-221 and accompanying text.
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would have qualified because the court referred to him as a well-
known artist, he was paid a very substantial sum for his work by
1938 standards, and the fresco was seen by many people in the
sanctuary for several years. Perhaps it received some critical
acclaim even though members of the congregation took offense at
the artist's portrayal of Jesus.57
Finally, it is vital to recognize that an artist's moral rights
are distinct from ownership of the fresco itself and ownership of
the copyright in the fresco. Moral rights may not be transferred
although they may be expressly waived in a written instrument,
signed by the artist.58 In essence, the church owns the fresco and
holds the copyright but absent an explicit written waiver the
artist still enjoys his moral rights in this work of visual art. On
the other hand, if the fresco is regarded as a work for hire, then
VARA would not apply and the church would not need to worry
about having the written waiver. 59 It is likely, however, that an
artist like Crimi would be treated as an independent contractor.60
If the church did not receive a written waiver from the artist,
it would have violated VARA by painting over the fresco or by
tearing out that section of the wall and applying a new layer of
plaster. Either would seem to be an intentional mutilation,
distortion or modification of the fresco that might prejudice his
honor or reputation, and it also might destroy this work of
recognized stature. Accordingly, the church's destruction of the
mural could entitle the artist to damages. 61 As noted above, if the
artist had received advance notice of the church's plans, he might
have been able to obtain an injunction to protect the fresco against
being painted over or otherwise removed and perhaps destroyed.
57 Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1949).
58 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1)-(2).
59 Id. § 101(B). "A work of visual art does not include - any work made for hire." Id.
60 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-53 (1989).
61 Violators of VARA are subject to the normal liabilities for infringement. See H.
REP., supra note 7, at 6932. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610,
614 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming award of statutory damages for destruction of sculpture);
Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., No. 13-CV-5612 (FB)(JMA), 2013 WL 6172732, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013) (after refusing to enjoin destruction of an abandoned
commercial building decorated with graffiti the court noted that the plaintiffs still had
the opportunity to seek damages from the developer who had permitted them to adorn
the buildings with their art).
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What about the interests of the church and its congregation?
Are their rights as well as their collective taste in art depicting
Christ trumped by Crimi's moral rights? 62
VARA addresses this tension to some degree. Section
113(d)(1), the so called "buildings exception,"63 provides that when
"a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a
building in such a way that removing the work from the building
will cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation or other
modification of the work" and the artist and the owner of the
building both signed a written instrument specifying that
"installation of the work may subject the work to destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or other modification by reason of its
removal," then the artist's rights against destruction and
distortion shall not apply.64 However, absent this written
acknowledgment that removal may result in the fresco's
destruction, it would appear that the church and its congregation
would be stuck with the fresco for the life of the artist,65 or liable
for a substantial award of damages in the event they decide to
destroy the mural.66 Perhaps they could cover it with a tapestry in
such a way that the fresco itself would not be damaged and try to
fit under VARA's public presentation exception. 67
Section 113(d)(2) addresses the rights of the church and the
congregation in the event it might be possible to remove the fresco
without its destruction or modification. In essence, the artist's
rights against distortion, mutilation and destruction will not apply
62 See Attlesey, supra note 27, at 374 (noting that in some circumstances under
VARA, the artist's rights will be greater than those of the building owner).
63 Pa & Robinson, supra note 14, at 26. This exception was arguably motivated by
the litigation over the removal of Richard Serra's massive "Titled Arc" sculpture from
Federal Plaza in lower Manhattan. The seventy-three ton work, made of steel, had to
be cut into three parts for removal. Id. See, e.g., Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847
F.2d 1045, 1047 (2d Cir. 1988) (artist commissioned to create and sell site specific
sculpture to the government was unsuccessful in challenging the government's
subsequent decision to relocate the work-this was a pre-VARA claim and the artist's
contract with the government provided that all designs, sketches, models and the work
produced would be the property of the government-and there were no restrictions on
the government's use of the work).
- 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(A)-(B).
65 See Attlesey, supra note 27, at 379-80. Rights under VARA exist for the lifetime
of the author. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b), (d)(1).
66 Of. Goodin, supra note 51, at 574-75.
67 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2). See infra notes 223-40 and accompanying text.
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if the church makes a diligent and good faith attempt to notify
him or her about plans to remove the artwork, and then, assuming
the artist receives the notice, he or she fails to remove the work or
pay for its removal within ninety days after receiving the notice. 68
Perhaps the most obvious lesson from this twenty-first
century variation on the late 1940s litigation over Crimi's fresco is
that any person or entity commissioning a work of visual art that
will be incorporated in or integrated with a building or other piece
of property needs a written instrument from the artist complying
with section 113(d)(1) that waives his or her VARA rights. 69 Of
course, the artist will have to agree to the waiver. 70 An alternative
would be for the commissioning party to insist that the artist
fabricate the work of visual art so that it could be dismantled and
removed without being modified or destroyed. Thus, the terms of
section 113(d)(2) could be satisfied in the event the commissioning
entity wants to have the art removed at some time in the future.
In addition, it would be wise to spell out those 113(d)(2) conditions
in a written instrument signed by the artist and the
commissioning entity.71 In any event, in the absence of a waiver or
a removable work, the muralist would seem to be able to restrict
what the commissioning entity does with its property for the rest
- 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(A)-(B). See generally Attlesey, supra note 27, at 385-87
(discussing what is removable and VARA's requirements); Goodin, supra note 51, at
568-72 (discussing section 113(d)).
69 See generally Goodin, supra note 51, at 573-75. Another author points out that
this waiver would have been unnecessary under California's Art Preservation Act
because it presumes that the integrity right is waived for works of art attached to
buildings absent a written agreement to the contrary. Attlesey, supra note 27, at 373.
7o See generally Goodin, supra note 51, at 576-78 (the author also discusses
whether it might be possible to consider the work of visual art as a "work for hire" and
thus unprotected by VARA).
71 See Justin Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework, Text and Context,
19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 19, 25-26 (2001) (discussing the impact of section 113
and how it forces artists to waive their rights to stop destruction or inspires them to go
with materials or formats that will permit removal). See generally Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, Authors in Disguise: Why the Visual Artists Rights Act Got It Wrong, 2007 UTAH
L. REV. 741, 760-61 (2007) (discussing VARA's approach to the installation of art in
buildings in section 113(d) and noting that VARA and its legislative history are silent
in respect to site specific art); Mills, supra note 14, at 461-63 (discussing problems with
VARA's waiver limitations including transaction costs).
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of his or her life: the artist's moral rights would trump the
commissioning entity's property rights. 72
The possibility of litigation in a modern version of Alfred
Crimi's dispute with the church that commissioned his fresco is
not far fetched. His potential VARA claims are meritorious. Still,
it is difficult to be unequivocal about how these VARA claims
would be resolved today. Given the restrictive way the courts have
interpreted the statute, as discussed in the next several sections,
Crimi's claims are not necessarily sure fire winners. There is
ample precedent for the commissioning party-the church-to
utilize in defending the muralist's VARA claims.
III. AVOIDING CRIMI: VARA AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
The scope of VARA is strictly limited by its terms. As
discussed in the overview section of this article, the definition of
'work of visual art' in section 101 is narrow and it is followed by
several exceptions listing creative works that do not fall within
the definition.73 Similarly, the rights of attribution and integrity
provided in section 106A are qualified by several explicit
exceptions. The following sections of this article discuss these
exceptions and explain how the courts have interpreted and
applied them to narrow the scope of this tightly restricted statute.
A. Works of Visual Art and VARA's Restrictions
A wide variety of works have been found by the courts to fall
within VARA's definition of protected works of visual art. For
example, the courts have treated as coming under VARA a large
walk-through sculpture in a building's lobby,7 4 a work with four
separate elements alleged to form an integrated whole,75 a modern
72 See Attlesey, supra note 27, at 379-80. See, e.g., Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l
Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at *7-10
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (litigation over sculpture attached to the side of a building
and whether or not it was removable as contemplated by 113(d)(2) or whether removal
would destroy the work, thus implicating section 113(d)(1)).
73 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
74 See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 1995) (plaintiffs lost
because the court found their lobby installation was a work for hire).
71 See Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Ams. Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620, 628 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
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statue in a public park,76 and a massive sculpture of a swan made
from plywood and steel.77 In litigation over the alleged improper
use of a photograph, a court said the definition covered negatives
as well as prints, contact sheets, and slides. 78 Unfinished works of
visual art have been protected, in part because copyright
protection is routinely extended to unfinished works of authorship
that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression.79 In view of the
Supreme Court's leading decisions on the low threshold for
satisfying the requirements for copyright protection, VARA's
copyrightability prerequisite is not much of a hurdle.80
The courts have, in accord with VARA's legislative history,
used common sense and generally accepted standards of the
artistic community in determining whether a particular work falls
within the definition. They recognize that artists work in various
media and use many different materials, so protection has not
depended on the medium or materials used.81 Protected sculptural
works have been extended to include castings, carvings, models,
and constructions. 82
Notwithstanding what might seem to be a generous and often
common sense approach to interpreting VARA's definition of
76 See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
71 See Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400-01 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (the plaintiff lost
because the large sculpture was not of recognized stature).
78 See Lilley v. Stout, 384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2005) (the plaintiff lost
because she could not show that her photo was produced for exhibition purposes only).
79 See, e.g., Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 50-
52 (1st Cir. 2010).
so See generally Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991);
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). See Kelley v. Chi. Park
Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011) (litigation concerning the modification of a massive
floral exhibit planted in 1984); Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., No. 13-CV-5612
(FB)(JMA), 2013 WL 6172732 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013) (graffiti decorating walls of an
abandoned commercial building that had been sprayed and painted with the owner's
permission within VARA).
81 See H. REP., supra note 7, at 6921. "[T]he term 'painting' includes murals, works
created on canvas, and the like." Id.
82 Id. For example, courts have held that "sculpture" encompasses a large walk
through installation which filled up most of a building's lobby, a massive installation
that covered most of an exhibition space the size of a football field, and a mosaic tile
depiction of a school's mascot and symbol. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d
77, 84 (2d Cir. 1995); Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc., 593 F.3d at 48
n.7; Jackson v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., No. 11-4023-CV-C-MJW, 2011 WL
5838432, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2011) (the mosaic might come within VARA).
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works of visual art, there are several exceptions to the definition
which have been interpreted and applied by the courts to prevent
quite a few works from being subject to VARA's protection.
1. A work of visual art does not include - (A)(i) any poster,
map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work,
book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base,
electronic information service, electronic publication, or
similar publication. 83
This broad exclusion is said to be "self-explanatory" and it
"reinforce[s] the premise of the bill: to cover only those works
described in the definition . . . and therefore to protect only
originals of those works of art. . . . [It] distinguish[es] covered
works of visual art from other works that are denied protection,
such as newspapers, audiovisual works, applied art, and maps." 8 4
One result of this limitation is that the rights of attribution and
integrity do not apply to the reproduction, portrayal, depiction or
other use of an otherwise protected work in connection with one of
the excluded items. For example, the depiction of an artist's work
upon a poster need not be accompanied by the artist's name.85
Books, magazines, and newspapers often include photos of
paintings and sculptural works, and movies contain scenes from
art galleries. It would be especially harsh for those depictions and
portrayals of works to result in potential liability.86
83 17 U.S.C. § 101(A)(i) (2012) (definition of work of visual art).
84 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6923 (this language from the legislative history also
applies to the limitations in section 101(A)(ii)).
85 See Berrios Nogueras. v. Home Depot, 330 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51 (D.P.R. 2004)
(quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 18, at § 8D.06); see also Wilson v. New
Palace Casino, L.L.C., Civil Action No. 1:11cv447-HSO-JMR, 2013 WL 870350 (S.D.
Miss. Mar. 7, 2013) (defendants' purported use of plaintiff's painting of fish on plastic
cups, menus, signage, "drink huggers," and t-shirts outside the scope of VARA).
86 See H. REP., supra note 7, at 6922-23; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 18, at
§ 8D.06; Davis, supra note 22, at 225; Jane Ginsburg, Moral Rights in the U.S.: Still in
Need of a Guardian Ad Litem, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 73, 82 (2012) (there is no
VARA right to compel attribution of one's artwork if the artist's name has been left off
anything more than the original or a signed and numbered limited edition copy). See,
e.g., Kamanou v. Exec. Sec'y of the Comm'n of the Econ. Cmty. of W. African States,
No. 10 Civ. 7286(GBD)(JLC), 2012 WL 162708, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012)
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This limitation on the definition of protected works was the
basis for the dismissal of a VARA claim against NASCAR brought
by an independent contractor who had been hired by the Franklin
Mint to design a trophy for NASCAR's NEXTEL Cup Series. 87 The
court said that VARA's definition did not extend to the many
drafts of the artist's "designs created to lay a foundation for the
eventual manufacturing of the trophy."88 In addition, these
drawings and designs fell under the "models" and "technical
drawings" exclusion because they were intended to be used in the
eventual creation of a three-dimensional object; the actual trophy
that would be fabricated by Tiffany's.89 In contrast, a sculpted clay
head for a large statue that was to be cast in bronze was treated
as a protected work of visual art and not within the exclusion for
"models" in Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine.90 The court said
that "model" was ambiguous so it turned to the legislative
history's precatory language encouraging courts to use common
sense and accepted standards of the artistic community to decide
whether a work fits within the general definition. 91 It concluded
that "models such as [this] clay sculpture [of a head] are
considered works of art in their own right."92
The publication of a photograph or other depiction of a work
of visual art in a magazine is not a violation of VARA due to this
limitation.93 The definition is cross referenced in section
106A(c)(3) which provides that the attribution and integrity rights
"shall not apply to any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other
use of a work in, upon, or in connection with any item described in
subparagraphs (A) or (B)." 9 4 For example, the unauthorized use of
(plaintiffs attribution claim fails in part because her publication did not qualify as a
work of visual art under VARA).
81 See Nat'1 Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Scharle, 356 F. Supp. 2d 515,
529 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
88 Id. The court said that the works did not exist in a single copy or a limited
number of signed and numbered copies but as multiple attempts to arrive at the
optimal design. Id.
89 Id.
9o See 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
91 See id. at 533 (quoting H. REP., supra note 7, at 6921).
92 Id.
93 See Martin v. Walt Disney Internet Grp., No. 09CV1601-MMA (POR), 2010 WL
2634695, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2010).
94 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
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a professional freelance photographer's copyrighted photo in
Competitor Magazine, without attribution or compensation, was
not actionable under VARA due to this exclusion even though the
photo was properly alleged to be a work of visual art.9 5 The court,
citing VARA's legislative history, explained that because the
reproduction of the photo in the magazine "do[es] not affect the
single or limited edition copy, imposing liability . . . would not
further the paramount goal of the legislation: to preserve and
protect certain categories of original works of art. It is the original
or limited edition still photographic image . . . that garners the
rights VARA bestows." 96
VARA's definition of works of visual art also excludes applied
art.97 This limitation is not defined other than an explanation in
the House Report that "work of visual art" is "narrower than the
definition of 'pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' set forth in
17 U.S.C. 101."98 This exclusion was discussed in Cheffins v.
Stewart; a case that concerned defendant's destruction of La
Contessa-a mobile interactive replica of a sixteenth century
Spanish galleon.99 This piece consisted of the fatade of a Spanish
galleon wrapped around a school bus that was no longer being
used to transport children. It been converted into a mobile stage
used for live performances.100 The court decided as a matter of law
that this bus or stage was "applied art" which it defined as "'two-
and three-dimensional ornamentation or decoration that is affixed
to otherwise utilitarian objects" and "works that are intended to
be or have been embodied in useful articles."101 It rejected the
plaintiffs' arguments that this bus or stage fell within the
decorative arts, that it was not used for a commercial purpose,
that it was no longer utilitarian, and that it should construe
broadly the works of visual art covered by VARA. The court
responded that "[a] broad construction of 'work of visual art'-and
95 See Martin, 2010 WL 2634695, at *5. The plaintiff stated a claim for copyright
infringement. Id. at *3.
96 Id. at *5 (citation omitted) (citing H. REP., supra note 7, at 6921-22).
97 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
9 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6921.
99 See No. 3:09-cv--00130-RAM, 2011 WL 1233378, at *1 (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2011).
100 See id. at *3.
101 Id. at *2. The court also said a work can be applied art and not be decorative art.
Id.
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consequently a narrow construction of 'applied art'-would be at
odds with Congress' intent to limit the application of VARA."102
2. A work of visual art does not include - (A)(ii) any
merchandising item or advertising, promotional,
descriptive, covering or packing material or container.103
The rationale for the promotional and advertising exclusions
from the definition of "work of visual art" in section (A)(ii) is the
same as the rationale for the exclusions in (A)(i) set forth in the
prior subsection. This exclusion was central to the decision in
Pollara v. Seymour.104
Joanne Pollara creates large banners and installations for
events like bar mitzvahs and corporate gatherings. She was
commissioned by the Gideon Coalition, a non-profit that provides
legal services, to prepare a banner for the group's annual
Lobbying Day at the state capital in Albany, New York. The
banner was to serve as a backdrop for the coalition's information
table that was to be set up on a state government owned public
plaza. Pollara received $1,800 for preparing a banner that was ten
feet high and thirty feet long. She spent over 100 hours on the
project and the finished work was a detailed tableau with several
colors depicting a diverse group of people standing in line to see a
lawyer. It also included messages calling for the preservation of
the right to counsel and warning that cuts in the executive budget
threatened this right. 05
Pollara erected the banner at the plaza the evening before
Lobbying Day. It was attached to two large steel poles weighed
down by sandbags. She left the banner unattended. The Gideon
Coalition had not, however, obtained a permit for erecting the
banner or leaving it up overnight. The manager of the plaza had it
removed. The work was torn into three pieces and crumpled when
102 Id. at *3; see also Landrau v. Solis Betancourt, 554 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 (D.P.R.
2007) (architectural works are not works of visual art protected under VARA). Cf
Piotraut, supra note 10, at 610 (discussing a French decision in which the court denied
an attribution claim made by a commissioned draftsman against Citroen, seeking to
have his name affixed to the coachwork of each vehicle, and seeming to treat industrial
design differently from other works).
103 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (definition of work of visual art).
104 See 344 F.3d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 2003).
105 See id. at 266.
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it was taken down. Pollara then filed a VARA claim against the
plaza manager and his supervisor in response to the destruction of
her work.106 She alleged that the banner was a work of visual art
covered by VARA and that her rights to prevent the work's
destruction and mutilation were violated through the willful,
wanton and intentional conduct of the defendants. 107
Pollara's VARA claim was unsuccessful. Following a bench
trial, the court ruled that VARA did not apply because the banner
constituted advertising or promotional material expressly
excluded from protection.108 The banner's purpose "was to attract
public attention and publicity to the [Gideon] information
table."109 The Second Circuit affirmed, saying that the artist failed
to show that her work fell within VARA's scope.110 However, one
judge on the panel agreed with the result but wrote a concurrence
in which he asserted that Pollara's claim failed because her
banner was not a work of recognized stature since it had never
been exhibited.111 Unlike the majority, he believed that there was
a potential factual dispute on whether or not the banner was
promotional material outside of VARA's protection. 112
Although the trial court and Second Circuit did not explicitly
raise concerns about property rights, both interpreted the statute
so as to reject the artist's VARA claim and thus avoided having to
reconcile the artist's moral rights against the rights of owners of
the public plaza. It was reasonable for the court of appeals to
conclude that the banner did not fall within VARA's definition of
106 See id. at 266-67.
107 See id. at 267. She also claimed, but later dropped, a First Amendment violation.
See id.
10 See Pollara v. Seymour, 206 F. Supp. 2d 333, 337-38 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). It also
ruled that the banner was not of recognized stature because it was not intended to be
preserved as a work of stature. Id. at 337.
109 Id.
11 See 344 F.3d at 268. See also infra note 116.
Mn See 344 F.3d at 271 (Gleeson, J., concurring).
112 See id. It should be noted that the district court also ruled that the banner was
not of recognized stature and suggested that this ruling was sufficient to support
summary judgment for the defendants. However, the Court of Appeals majority did not
consider this issue. See id. at 268 (majority opinion) (citing Pollara, 206 F. Supp. 2d at
337).
[VOL. 83:51006
THE EMPTY PROMISE OF VARA
"work of visual art."113 However, the court could have easily given
a broader scope to the "work of visual art" definition to exclude
only advertising or promotional works made for commercial
purposes. This point was made by Judge Gleeson in his concurring
opinion. He said that this definition "does not state that all works
that 'promote' are not works of visual art," that the majority's
broad construction of this limitation on the definition would
exclude a painting commissioned to promote the Olympics, and
that "there is nothing that suggests that a work originally created
for the purpose of promoting an event, product or cause could
never, over time, achieve the status of a work of recognized
stature, and thus be deserving of protection under VARA."114 As
noted above, he would have ruled for the defendants because the
plaintiffs destroyed banner had not achieved "recognized stature"
status.115
Judge Gleeson's opinion has merit and is consistent with the
copyright principle of aesthetic nondiscrimination announced over
a century ago by Justice Holmes in the United States Supreme
Court's influential Bleistein decision.116 The Supreme Court held
that posters used to advertise a circus were entitled to copyright
protection. The Court stated:
Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts
because their pictorial quality attracts the crowd, and
therefore gives them a real use, - if use means to increase
trade and to help make money. A picture is none the less a
picture, and none the less a subject of copyright, that is used
for an advertisement. And if pictures may be used to
advertise soap, or the theater, or monthly magazines, as they
are, they may be used to advertise a circus. Of course, the
113 Id. at 267. After considering the banner's message and purpose, as well as the
goals of the sponsoring organization, it was reasonable to conclude the banner was
promotional material. See id. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
114 Pollara, 344 F.3d at 271-72 (Gleeson, J., concurring). Cf. Bleisten v. Donaldson
Lithographing, 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (Justice Holmes explaining why copyright
protection extended to advertising posters that promoted a circus, why judges should
not pass judgment on the artistic merit of works, and that otherwise there was risk of
excommunicating from protection the works of highly regarded artists).
115 See infra notes 187-221 and accompanying text.
116 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside the narrowest and most obvious limits." Id.
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ballet is as legitimate a subject for illustration as any other. A
rule cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the
paintings of Degas.117
Of course, Justice Holmes was interpreting and applying
copyright law in Bleistein, not VARA with its legislative history.
The majority in Pollara emphasized throughout its opinion that
the scope of VARA was intended by Congress to be narrow, that
the definition "is a critical underpinning of the limited scope" of
VARA, and that the act "covers only a very select group of
artists."118 It is not surprising that several other courts have, like
the Second Circuit in Pollara, turned to the definition's exclusions
for advertising and promotional materials in section 101(A)(ii) as
the basis for dismissing VARA claims.119
Moreover, a contrary result might have caused tremendous
challenges for property owners. If Pollara's claim had been
successful, then the plaza manager would have violated VARA by
removing the banner even though it was not properly on the plaza
because no one obtained the required permit. If the plaintiff had
won, then VARA would seem to require a disgruntled property
owner to find the artist, tell him or her to remove the work, or
obtain permission to remove it at the artist's expense. Going
through those steps would have posed a substantial problem for
the manager of the government plaza. The banner could have had
an offensive message yet the manager of the plaza might have
117 Id.
118 Pollara, 344 F.3d at 269.
119 See Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2010) (bashed-
up Oldsmobile 88 created to serve as planter and advertising device not protected work
of visual art within VARA because it was "promotional" material); Rivera v. Mendez &
Co., 824 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.P.R. 2011) (reproduction of works of visual art for use in
advertising and promotional materials for annual jazz festival falls outside of VARA's
protection but plaintiff still has a viable copyright infringement claim); Teter v. Glass
Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1158 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (defendant's electronic images
of plaintiffs artwork on website, with watermark protection against copying, excluded
from liability under VARA's definition of work of visual art as merchandising or
advertising item); Berrios Nogueras v. Home Depot, 330 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51 (D.P.R.
2004) (posting of plaintiffs work of art in stores throughout Puerto Rico by means of
promotional brochures or advertising for brands of paint excluded from the scope of
VARA). The law does not protect merchandising items or advertising "presumably
because the intent in such items is to successfully promote the artist, which requires
preserving integrity in how the artist's work is portrayed." Teter, 723 F. Supp. 2d at
1158.
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been forced to leave it up as he tracked down the artist. The risk
of not taking those precautions would have been potential liability
for violating VARA if the banner had been damaged. The plaza
manager could assert that the destroyed or damaged work was not
of "recognized stature"-and thus not subject to a destruction
claim under VARAl20-but even this seems to put too much of
burden on the property manager.121
Instead of ruling that the banner was promotional material
or concluding that it was not of recognized stature because it had
never been seen, it might have been easier for the court to rule
that VARA is inapplicable to works that are improperly placed on
someone else's property. 122 Some courts have announced rulings to
this effect. 123 Otherwise, VARA would arguably apply to graffiti
sprayed on walls without permission of the property owner, 124 and
artists would be able to block development of vacant lots by
installing artwork without permission. This would be irrational.125
120 This was Judge Gleeson's reason for ruling against the plaintiff in Pollara. 344
F.3d at 271 (Gleeson, J., concurring).
121 Cf Attlesey, supra note 27, at 388-89 ("Forcing building owners to protect works
which are attached to buildings without their knowledge or consent is a wholly
undesirable result.").
122 Pollara's banner had been placed on the plaza a day before the scheduled event
even though the required permit had not been obtained.
123 See, e.g., Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 329 (5th Cir. 2010) (a bashed-up Oldsmobile 88
created to serve as a planter and to promote the opening of a store was not protected by
VARA against enforcement of a local ordinance banning junked vehicles); English v.
BFC&R East 11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 3, 1997), aff'd sub nom., English v. BFC Partners, 198 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that VARA was inapplicable to plaintiffs' sculptures and murals that had been
placed on the defendant's property illegally). Cf. Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., No. 13-
CV-5612 (FB)(JMA), 2013 WL 6172732 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013) (graffiti artists, who
were given permission to decorate abandoned building by owner/developer, knew that
their works would be temporary).
124 Cf. Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 280 Cal. Rptr. 535, 537 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that California's moral rights statute applied only to art that is affixed or
attached by arrangement with the owner and saying it obviously does not apply to
graffiti); Cohen, 2013 WL 6172732 (owner of the site had given plaintiffs permission to
decorate the wall but had indicated from the beginning that the building would be
demolished).
125 English, 1997 WL 746444, at *3. See also Mallika Rao, Artists Bid Sad Farewell
to 5 Pointz, New York City Graffiti Mecca, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 21, 2013, available
at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/21/5-pointz-n_4316483.html (owner of
building who let artists use its walls as a canvas for graffiti received permission from
the city to demolish the building and erect apartment buildings on the site). But cf.
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3. A work of visual art does not include - (B) any work
made for hire.126
The specific exclusion of works made for hire from VARA's
definition of protected works of visual art is stated in the House
Report to be self-explanatory 27 even though the idea that the
employee-artist does not have moral rights in the creations done
for an employer is antithetical to moral rights theory. 128 Still,
perhaps it also can be explained by distinctions between the
creative effort of an individual artist and the collaborative efforts
of a group of creative persons working together on a project,
consideration of who is bearing the financial risk for a work of
visual art, and understanding the differences between how
individual works and collaborative works are adapted after public
exposure.129 VARA's legislative history states:
Where an individual creating a work typically retains the
economic rights in it, such as a visual artist does, an
additional grant of rights such as those accorded [by VARA]
will not impede distribution of the work. By contrast, those
who participate in a collaborative effort, such as an
audiovisual work, do not typically own the economic rights.
Instead, audiovisual works are generally works-made-for-
hire. Granting these artists the rights of attribution and
integrity might conflict with the distribution and marketing
of these works.
Motion pictures and other audiovisual works are generally
produced and exploited in multiple copies. They are leased for
theatrical and non-theatrical exhibition, licensed for
broadcasting, shown on airplanes, and sold as videocassettes.
Each market has its own commercial and technological
configurations that effects how works will appear when
presented. In contrast, the works of visual art covered by
Attlesey, supra note 27, at 387-88 (discussing art attached to a building without the
owner's consent and suggesting that this art may be protected by VARA).
126 17 U.S.C. § 101(B) (2012).
127 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6919.
128 See Damich, supra note 12, at 987.
129 Id. at 988.
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[VARA] are limited to originals: works created in single copies
or in limited editions . . . .130
Although this selection from the House Report explains why
Congress decided against extending moral rights to creators of
audiovisual works, it notes that collaborative works like movies
are typically works for hire. They are different from those single
and limited edition works of visual art which are protected by
VARA.
In general, the scope of the "work made for hire" doctrine
under United States copyright law is broad and not as pro-author
as in many countries that recognize moral rights. This means that
an employee in the United States who creates a work of visual art
for his employer is more likely to come within the "work for hire"
doctrine than his or her counterpart in France or Germany who is
creating a similar work of visual art for his or her foreign
employer. As a result, the American employee will not have moral
rights in regard to this work of visual art while the French or
German employee might enjoy those rights. 131 In short, the "work
made for hire" exclusion from VARA looms large even though a
persuasive argument can be made that at least the attribution
right is not incompatible with the policies underlying "work for
hire."132
A leading decision on this exclusion is Carter v. Helmsley-
Spear, in which three artists were hired by the lessee of a building
in Queens, New York to "design, create and install sculpture and
other permanent installations in the building, primarily the
lobby."133 They had "full authority in design, color and style,"
while the lessee had "authority to direct the location and
installation of the artwork within the building." 134 The artists
constructed a huge walk-through work with environmental and
recycling themes. It consisted of a variety of materials that were
affixed to the building's walls and ceilings. There was also a large
130 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6919.
131 Cf. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 273; see also supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
132 See Damich, supra note 12, at 989.
1as Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1995).
134 Id. The artists retained copyright, and the lessee was to receive 50% of any
proceeds from exploitation of the work. Id.
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glass mosaic on the lobby's floor. The installation was made of
many unusual items including "a giant hand fashioned from an
old school bus, a face made of automobile parts, and a number of
interactive components." 135
The lessee eventually went bankrupt, and the owners of the
building terminated the lease. The owners found a new lessee who
hired Helmsley-Spear to manage the building.136 Helmsley-Spear
told the artists to stop working on the project, and that the
installation was going to be removed. The artists filed suit under
VARA to prevent removal.137 They maintained that their lobby
installation was a single interrelated work of visual art that was
incorporated into the building's lobby. As a consequence, they
claimed that removing the installation or taking it apart would be
"a distortion . .. [or] modification . .. prejudicial to [their] honor or
reputation," as well as the destruction of a work of recognized
stature.138 They obtained a preliminary injunction preventing
modification and destruction, 139 and, following a bench trial, they
were granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants
from modifying, distorting, or removing the art for their lifetimes.
In reaching this decision the trial court concluded that the walk-
through sculpture in the lobby was a single integrated work of
visual art under VARA that had recognized stature. 140
The trial court also determined that this work was not
excluded from protection as a work made for hire because the
three artists were not employees but independent contractors.141
The court's thorough discussion and application of the factors
135 Id. The artists worked for over a year on the project, and although they were still
working at the time of their disagreement with the building's owner, most of the
installation had been completed. Id. at 81.
136 Id. The ownership, leasehold, and management of the property were very
complex. Most of the complexities are not important, but some facts are relevant. The
owner of the building was 474431 Associates. Id. at 80. The lessee of the building was
47-44 31st Street Associates, L.P. Id. The company working for this lessee to manage
the building was SIG Management Company. Id. SIG, as agent of the lessee, was the
company that hired the artists to construct the artwork. Id. at 80-81
137 Id. at 81.
138 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2012).
139 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
140 861 F. Supp. 303, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
141 Id. at 317-22.
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enumerated by the Reid decision 42 emphasized that the hiring
party did not have the right to control the manner and means of
creation of the installation, 14 3 that a high degree of skill was
required to create the work, 144 that the artists were hired only for
this project, 145 and that the hiring party was not in the business of
creating works of visual art. 146 The fact that the hiring party
provided the artists with health and insurance benefits for three
years along with W-2 forms supported the defendants' contention
that the plaintiffs were employees but was not decisive to the
district court since the artists continued to work on the project
after the benefits were stopped.147
The owner of the building and the new lessee lost the right to
remove or modify this massive lobby installation because the trial
court held that it was a protected work of visual art. The
installation could not be hidden nor could its effect on visitors be
minimized. In addition, the owner and lessee were unable to use
the lobby for other purposes due to the square footage occupied by
the walk-through sculpture. Moreover, the work by the three
artists had been commissioned by the prior lessee, who was now
bankrupt. Neither the new owner nor the new lessee had anything
to do with that commission yet they were stuck with the lobby
installation due to the permanent injunction granted by the trial
court.148
On appeal the Second Circuit had to decide whether to
protect the art installation by affirming the trial court's ruling, or
to find a way to protect the owner's and lessee's property rights. 149
142 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 731, 751 (1989) (to determine
whether a work is made for hire under the Copyright Act a court needs to ascertain,
using principles of the common law of agency, whether the work was prepared by an
employee or an independent contractor).
143 861 F. Supp. at 318.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 319.
146 Id. at 321.
147 Id. at 319. The court discussed several other Reid factors as well.
148 The term "owner" is often used in this discussion, but a lessee could also lose
many of the same rights depending on the terms of the lease. For example, if a lessee
would have the right to decorate the lobby under the terms of the agreement, then it
would lose that right if the artists could force it under VARA to keep the installation in
the lobby.
149 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Although the Second Circuit agreed with the trial court's
determination that the sculptural installation was one individual
work,150 it did not rule on the other issues. It stated that "we need
not discuss [VARA's] broad protection of visual art and the
protection it affords works of art incorporated into a building."151
Instead, it held that the work was not covered by VARA because it
was as a work for hire1 52 and thus excluded from VARA's
definition of a "work of visual art."15 3
Like the trial court, the Second Circuit applied the multiple
factor "Reid test" to reach its conclusion. It noted that the test is
easily misapplied, and that although it is usually reluctant to
reverse a trial court's findings on the presence or absence of the
Reid factors, the "ultimate legal conclusion as to whether or not
the sculpture is a 'work for hire' is reviewed de novo."154 The court
went on to say that "[olur review of the legal conclusion drawn
from balancing the various Reid factors persuades us that the
factors that weigh in favor of finding the artists were employees
outweigh those factors supporting the artists' claims that they
were independent contractors."155 The court explained that payroll
formalities and benefits coupled with their assignment of
additional projects, being paid weekly over two years, being
furnished with supplies, and not being able to hire assistants
without consent of the now bankrupt lessee were more than
sufficient to demonstrate that they were employees and that the
lobby sculpture was a work made for hire. 156
The Reid test is fact dependent and involves balancing. The
Second Circuit said that it did not intend to marginalize factors
like artistic freedom and skills, nor did it intend to put too much
weight on contract language and the deduction of FICA taxes. It
150 Id. at 83-84 (the finding of "singleness" was not clearly erroneous). The lower
court and the court of appeals were not troubled that the installation was unfinished.
151 Id. at 88.
152 "Work for hire" is defined at 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Carter, 71 F.3d at 85-88
(applying the factors from Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730
(1989)).
153 Carter, 71 F.3d at 85, 88 (discussing the exclusions from the definition of VARA's
"works of visual art" as including any work for hire).
154 Id. at 85.
155 Id. at 87.
156 Id. at 87-88. The court also said that some of the trial court's factual findings
were clearly erroneous. Id. at 85.
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said that this would run counter to the remedial purposes of
VARA and ignore the moral rights of artists whose works come
under this "pathbreaking legislation."1 57 It also said that future
cases will not fit neatly in either the employee or independent
contractor categories.158  Notwithstanding this cautionary
language, it is evident that the Reid test, like other tests with
many factors, can be manipulated so results become
unpredictable. 159 Moreover, the Second Circuit applied the "work
for hire" doctrine in a way that avoided expansion of VARA and
thereby protected property rights. This is evidenced by its
statement that although Congress was encouraging artists by
enacting VARA, it "did not mandate the preservation of art at all
costs and without due regard for the rights of others." 160 In stating
this, the court emphasized that a property owner's rights had to
be given considerable weight.
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear is a relatively early VARA decision
and the Second Circuit's ruling may have started a judicial trend
of protecting property rights when faced with a possible expansion
of VARA.161 At a minimum, it shows that in cases where the
artist's status as an employee or independent contractor is
uncertain a court can avoid ruling on an artist's attribution or
integrity claims by holding that the work at issue is made for hire
so that VARA is inapplicable.
157 Id. at 87.
158 Id.
159 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 274 n.5 (it is not clear whether some of the Reid
factors are more important than others).
160 Carter, 71 F.3d at 80.
161 Cf. Piotraut, supra note 10, at 600-01 (discussing a French decision that denied
an attribution claim by a commissioned draftsman against a car manufacturer,
explaining that designer's work was accessory in comparison with vehicle itself and the
company that took an exploitation risk). Some cases are easy. See, e.g., Kamanou v.
Exec. Sec. of the Com'n on Econ. Cmty. of W. African States, No. 10 Civ.
7286(GBD)(JLC), 2012 WL 162708, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012) (plaintiffs
attribution claim under VARA fails because her written work for the UN was a work
for hire and because it was not a work of visual art).
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4. A work of visual art does not include - (C) any work not
subject to copyright protection under this title.16 2
According to VARA's legislative history, the copyrightability
exclusion makes the act's "scope consistent with current copyright
law, but granting protection to only those works subject to
copyright protection under title 17. This avoids any tension
between the public's ability to exploit the work under copyright
law and the rights granted under [VARA]."163 For example, even if
a golf course designer could persuade a judge that his or her work
constituted a work of visual art as a kind of sculpture, it would
still not qualify under VARA because a golf course is not eligible
for copyright protection. 164
This copyrightability limitation was critical to the 2011
decision in Kelley v. Chicago Park District.65 Chapman Kelley is a
nationally recognized artist known for his floral and woodland
interpretations. He was given permission in 1984 by the Chicago
Park District to do a wildflower display at the northern end of
Grant Park. He planted two large elliptical flowerbeds with native
wildflowers and edged them with borders of gravel and steel. This
installation was titled Wildflower Works, and was promoted as
"living art."166 The exhibit covered approximately 1.5 acres and
contained between 200,000 and 380,000 wildflowers which Kelley
purchased, planted, cultivated, and pruned. The massive floral
exhibit received glowing reviews. 6 7
There were disagreements between Kelley and the Park
District during the next twenty years about maintaining the
162 17 U.S.C. § 101(C) (2012).
163 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6924.
164 Ryan C. Steinman, Taking a Mulligan: Moral Rights and the Art of Golf Course
Design, 51 IDEA 47, 60 (2010).
165 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011). The decision also
addresses whether VARA applies to site-specific art. See also Michelle Chatelain,
Copyright Protection of a Garden: Kelley v. Chicago Park District Holds that Gardens
are Not Artwork Subject to Intellectual Property Protection, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 385 (2011).
166 Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291. Grant Park is one of Chicago's major public parks. It is
downtown and bordered by Michigan Avenue on the west and Lake Michigan on the
east.
167 Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C07715, 2008 WL 449886, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
29, 2008). The seedlings cost between $80,000 and $152,000. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 293.
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exhibit. 168 In 2004, the Park District decided it wanted to
reconfigure the beds; reduce the display area from 66,000 to
30,000 square feet and to make them rectangular. The Park
District sought Kelley's input and approval but he did not okay
the proposed reconfiguration. The Park District implemented the
new plan anyway with wildflowers replanted on a smaller scale
with rectilinear borders. Because of this reconfiguration, Kelley
brought suit for VARA violations.16 9
Kelley claimed, and the trial court agreed, that Wildflower
Works could be treated as both a painting and as sculpture, thus
qualifying as a work of visual art under VARA.170 He contended
that the Park District's reconfiguration of his work was an
"intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification" that was
"prejudicial to his reputation,"171 but the court ruled against him,
holding that the work "lacked sufficient originality to be eligible
for copyright, a foundational requirement in the statute."172 The
trial court also followed the lead of the First Circuit in Phillips v.
Pembroke Real Estate in ruling that the garden was site specific
art excluded from protection under VARA.173
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It initially discussed, in
extended dicta, the Park District's failure to challenge the trial
court's conclusion that Wildflower Works was either a painting or
168 Under the terms of Kelley's agreement with the Park District he was to install
and maintain this "permanent" floral exhibit at his expense, and the District reserved
the right to terminate the installation by giving the artist ninety days notice to remove
the planting. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 292. The District wanted to discontinue the exhibit in
1988 but Kelley sued, the parties settled, and the District agreed to extend a
"temporary permit" for another year. Id. at 294. This permit did not have the ninety-
day notice of termination provision but it did state "this agreement does not create any
proprietary interest for Chicago Wildflower Works, Inc. or Mr. Chapman Kelley in
continuing to operate or maintain the Display after September 1, 1989." Id. Temporary
extensions of this permit were granted until 1994. Id. Nevertheless, Kelley and his
volunteers continued to cultivate the garden without a permit until 2004. Id.
169 Id. at 294,-95.
170 Id. at 295. The court arguably misread the statute by failing to recognize that a
work cannot be covered by VARA if it is not copyrightable. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
The Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process Theology for Authorship and Moral
Rights, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889, 901 (2012).
171 Kelley, 635 F.3d at 295.
172 Id. at 292.
173 See id. at 295 (citing Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128 (1st
Cir. 2006)). However, the trial court ruled in Kelley's favor on a breach of contract
claim and awarded him nominal damages. Id. at 292.
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sculpture. According to the court, "[t]his is an astonishing
omission. VARA's definition of 'work of visual art' operates to
narrow and focus the statute's coverage; only a 'painting, drawing,
print or sculpture,' or exhibition photograph will qualify." 174 The
appellate court agreed with the lower court's concern about
"tension between the law and the evolution of ideas in modern or
avant garde art" and about being "too literalist" as to whether an
object is a painting or sculpture. 175 However, it stated "there's a
big difference between avoiding a literalistic approach and
embracing one that is infinitely malleable. The judge appears to
have come down too close to the latter extreme."176 It added that
the case raised serious questions about VARA's definition of work
of visual art that had decisive consequences for many moral rights
claims. Nevertheless, since the Park District did not challenge this
aspect of the lower court ruling, the Seventh Circuit turned to the
copyrightability exclusion. 177
The court explained that VARA supplements copyright
protection for a limited subcategory of works and that these
VARA-eligible works "comprise a discrete subset of otherwise
copyrightable pictorial and sculptural works" and "[ijf a work is so
lacking in originality that it cannot satisfy the basic requirements
for copyright, then it can hardly qualify as a painting or sculpture
eligible for extra protection under VARA."178 It proceeded to
discuss the originality requirement at length, said that the district
court made the mistake of equating originality with novelty, and
then explained that the "real impediment to copyright here is ...
that a living garden lacks the kind of authorship and stable
fixation normally required to support copyright."179 It accepted
that artists might regard Kelley's garden as postmodern
conceptual art, and it acknowledged that copyright's prerequisites
of authorship and fixation are broadly defined, but said that "the
174 Id. at 300.
175 Id. at 301 (quoting Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04-C-07715, 2008 WL 4449886,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176 Id.
177 See id. at 301-02.
178 Id. at 302.
179 Id. at 303.
1018 [VOL. 83:5
THE EMPTY PROMISE OF VARA
law must have some limits; not all conceptual art may be
copyrighted."s18
In essence, Kelley's Wildflower Works was neither authored
nor fixed in the senses required by copyright. It was planted and
cultivated, not authored; its elements were alive and changing,
not fixed; and it owed most of its form to natural forces, though,
the gardener/designer assists nature.181 The court did not go so far
as to state that artists who incorporate natural or living elements
in their works can never claim copyright protection, but it rejected
as inapt Kelley's comparisons of his garden to a fountain-sculpture
in Chicago's Millennium Park, the mobiles of Alexander Calder,
and Jeff Koons' forty-three foot flowering topiary 'Puppy.'18 2 Given
the failure of Kelley's garden to satisfy these basic requirements
for copyright protection, it could not qualify for moral rights
protection under VARA.183
One can take issue with the Seventh Circuit's conclusions
about authorship, fixation, and copyrightability in Kelley. The
ellipse shaped gardens and the placement of particular
wildflowers in those spaces owed their origin to Chapman Kelley.
The artistic judgment he exercised in planning and then executing
Wildflower Works easily satisfies the "modicum of creativity"
required by the Feist decision. 184 According to the Supreme Court,
an author is "he to whom anything owes its origin; originator;
180 Id. at 304.
181 See id.
182 Id. at 305. The court explained that the surfaces of the Millennium Park
fountain were embedded with LED screens that replay video images, thus satisfying
the fixation requirement; that although the aesthetic effects of a Calder mobile's
movements were attributable to air currents, there was no doubt that the mobile itself
was fixed; and that Koons' huge dog had a fixed metal frame covered with flowers
sustained by an irrigation system. See id.
183 See id. at 306. The Seventh Circuit also discussed, but did not decide, questions
raised by the trial court's determination that the garden was site-specific art and thus
outside of VARA's scope. It took issue with the First Circuit's all or nothing approach to
site-specific art in Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate and explained that a categorical
exclusion of site-specific art from VARA was not so obvious to it. Still, since it resolved
Kelley's VARA claim on other grounds, the court did not have to say whether the
statute was inapplicable to such art. See id. at 306-07. It ultimately reversed the trial
court ruling in Kelley's favor on his breach of contract claim, saying there was no
evidence that the Park District authorized a Commissioner to enter a contract with
Kelley. See id. at 307-08.
184 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
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maker; one whom completes a work,"185 and writings include all
forms "by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given
visible expression."18 6 Wildflower Works certainly changed with
the seasons, and it does not fit nicely within our traditional
conceptions of painting and sculpture, but it was very much the
tangible creation of Chapman Kelley, and it received glowing
reviews as living art. It was "sufficiently permanent . . . to permit
it to be perceived . . . for a period of more than a transitory
duration."187 The garden's fluidity due to weather, changes in the
seasons, the varied times when flowers bloom should not
automatically rule out copyrightability. 188 Nevertheless, the
Seventh Circuit, like other courts which have had to grapple with
VARA claims that seek to expand the statute's reach, interpreted
VARA restrictively and arguably consistently with legislative
intent; "to provide very circumscribed federal statutory protection
for only certain types of visual art."189
B. Limitations on the Attribution and Integrity Rights
1. The right to "prevent any destruction of a work of
recognized stature."190
The creator of a work of visual art with recognized stature
enjoys the right to prevent the destruction of that work. "[Any
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a
15 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
16 Id.
187 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of fixation).
188 Cf. Kwall, supra note 170, at 916-17.
189 Id. at 915. Cf. Chatelain, supra note 165, at 393-94. The copyrightability
exclusion could be used to deny VARA claims by illegal graffiti artists seeking to
prevent their works from being painted over, washed away or otherwise removed. Cf.
Jamison Davies, Art Crimes?: Theoretical Perspectives on Copyright Protection for
Illegally-Created Graffiti Art, 65 ME. L. REV. 28, 31 (2012). This author also states that
it is unlikely that graffiti can be protected under VARA. See id. at 43-44. See also
Michelle Bougdanos, The Visual Artists Rights Act and Its Application to Graffiti
Murals: Whose Wall Is It Anyway, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 549, 565 (2002). But see
Cohen v. G & M Realty LP, No. 13-CV-5612(FB)(JMA), 2013 WL 6172732, at *13
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013) (no authority under VARA to prevent destruction of graffiti
art decorating walls of an abandoned building even though the owner had given the
artists permission to decorate, but the artists might have a claim for damages under
VARA after the site owner painted over all the works).
Mo 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
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violation of that right."191 The recognition of this moral right
acknowledges "that destruction of works of art has a detrimental
effect on the artist's reputation, and that it also represents a loss
to society."192 However, in order for this right to be invoked, the
work must be of "recognized stature."
The bill, as first introduced, established a virtual per se
standard with regard to protecting works of "recognized stature"
in respect to all aspects of the integrity right; distortions,
mutilations, and certain modifications as well as destruction.
However, the drafters eventually endorsed the "prejudicial to
honor and reputation" standard with respect to all covered works,
not just those with recognized stature. This was done to avoid
experts battling in every case over whether a work of visual art
had recognized stature. The revision also acknowledges that less
well known or appreciated artists have honor and reputations
worthy of protection. 193 The deletion of the general "recognized
stature" language is seen as being "consistent with the fact
that ... many works now universally acknowledged as
masterpieces have been rejected and often misunderstood by the
general public at the time they were created."194
However, the "recognized stature" requirement was retained
as a limit to the artist's moral right against destruction. One court
stated in regard to the destruction of a banner, that:
It defies the underlying purposes of VARA to assume that the
statute was intended to protect works of artistic merit without
regard to whether such works were ever intended as 'art' or
whether they were intended to be displayed as art or were
otherwise intended to be preserved for posterity as works of
artistic merit. 195
191 Id. This right, and the right to prevent distortion and mutilations that are
prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation, are also subject to the limitations set
forth in section 113(d). 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(a)(3).
192 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6926. Recognition of a moral right against destruction is
not universal. See generally Lipton, supra note 12, at 546-47.
193 See H. REP., supra note 7, at 6925.
194 Id.
195 Pollara v. Seymour, 206 F. Supp. 2d 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (the banner was
meant to be used to publicize a one-time event and would not have been preserved - it
was not of recognized stature).
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Sometimes the parties might agree that a work has
recognized stature because the artist is well known and his or her
works are held in very high esteem in the arts community. This is
arguably illustrated by the sculptures of David Phillips, which are
often integrated in their surrounding environment and regarded
as site specific. When he sued an entity responsible for the
redesign of his nautical themed sculpture park on Boston's harbor,
the defendant did not dispute that his work was of recognized
quality.196 On the other hand, a defendant who is about to destroy,
or has already destroyed, a work of visual art that is not well
known or created by a relatively unknown artist may want to
assert that the work is not of recognized stature. VARA does not
define this limitation on the right against destruction.
The accepted test for determining whether a work is of
recognized stature was stated by the trial court in the Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear litigation, in which the court enjoined the removal
of a large art installation that was integrated into a building's
lobby. 197 Even though the trial court's ruling was reversed by the
Second Circuit because the installation was deemed to be a work
for hire unprotected by VARA,198 the lower court's thoughtful
discussion of how to determine recognized stature has been used
by other courts. 199 The trial court stated:
[T]he recognized stature requirement is best viewed as a gate-
keeping mechanism - protection is afforded only to those
works of art that art experts, the art community, or society in
general views as possessing stature. A plaintiff need not
demonstrate that his or her art work is equal in stature to
that created by artists such as Picasso, Chagall, or
Giacometti. As one commentator has noted, "The advantages
196 See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 89, 103 (D. Mass.
2003). I say arguably because Phillips had affidavits and articles about his work
generally and this park specifically from several art experts and critics. On appeal, the
First Circuit did not resolve whether this public sculpture park was of recognized
stature because it held that VARA did not protect site specific art. Phillips v. Pembroke
Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir. 2006).
197 See 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See supra notes 133-161 and
accompanying text.
1s See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 1995).
199 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999);
English v. BFC & R 11th St., No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 3, 1997); Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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of the 'of recognized stature' qualification include barring
nuisance law suits," . . . Nor must the trier of fact personally
find the art to be aesthetically pleasing; indeed, courts have
persistently shunned the role of art critic. 200
The court also said that this determination should be based
on the testimony of experts on both sides of the issue, and that
satisfying the "recognized stature" test requires the work to be
viewed as meritorious.201
The Carter test was used in Martin v. City of Indianapolis,
one of the rare reported VARA decisions in which the artist
won. 2 0 2 Jan Randolph Martin erected a twenty-by-forty-foot metal
sculpture on private property in Indianapolis. There was an
agreement by which the city's Department of Metropolitan
Development was obligated to give the owners of this land and the
sculpture ninety days to remove it in the event the department
reached certain determinations about future use of the
property. 203 Recognizing that his work might have to moved,
Martin engineered it so that it could be disassembled. 2 0 4 In 1992,
the City notified the landowner that it was considering acquiring
the property as part of an urban renewal project, and the City was
reminded about the agreement. The artist then appeared before
the development commission to offer input about relocating his
work, and the city responded by saying that he would be contacted
in the event it had to be removed. Nevertheless, the city "awarded
a contract to demolish the sculpture, and demolition followed, all
without prior notice" to the artist or the property owner.205
Martin's one-count complaint under VARA was for the city's
violation of his right against destruction of a work of recognized
stature. 206 The district court considered Martin's sculpture to be of
"recognized stature" and granted summary judgment in his
200 Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325 (quoting Damich, supra note 12, at 954). In a
footnote the court said that this test was consistent with an earlier version of VARA
providing that the court should take into account the opinions of artists, art dealers,
and collectors. Id. at 325 n.10.
201 Id. at 325.
202 See 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999).
203 See id. at 610.
204 See id. at 611.
205 Id.
206 See id. at 612 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B)).
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favor. 207 The primary issue on appeal was the "recognized stature"
finding. Martin asserted that the test from Carter v. Helmsley-
Spear was more rigorous than Congress intended, but the court
said there was no need for it to refine that rule. It then noted that
Martin's evidence on stature was not as complete as in the Carter
litigation, because Martin's work "was destroyed by the City
without the opportunity for experts to appraise the sculpture in
place."208
Instead of offering evidence of experts or others by affidavit
or otherwise, Martin's evidence of stature included favorable
newspaper and magazine articles from 1982, various positive
letters from that time period including one from an art gallery
director and another to the editor of a local paper, and the
program from a show at which his model for the sculpture won a
prize. One of the letters said that the proposed sculpture was "an
interesting and aesthetically stimulating configuration of forms
and structure" and another said that it "unites the area, providing
a nexus, a marker, a designation, an identity and, presumably, a
point of pride."209 Notwithstanding the defendant's hearsay and
inadequate foundation arguments, the trial court found that
Martin had met his "recognized stature" burden of proof, and the
appellate court agreed with its assessment. 210
Judge Manion dissented on the recognized stature
determination, saying that summary judgment was
inappropriate. 211 He pointed out that VARA was not meant to
regulate urban renewal, but to protect great works of art from
destruction and he agreed with the trial court in Carter that the
"recognized stature" requirement serves as a gatekeeper so that
protection is afforded only to works that art experts and the
artistic community view as having stature. Experts have to weigh
in on the issue. "A plaintiff cannot satisfy his burden of
207 Id. at 610, 612. The trial court awarded Martin "statutory damages in the
maximum amount allowed for a non-wilful statutory violation." Id. at 610. The
destruction was the result of bureaucratic failure as opposed to willful conduct. See id.
at 614.
208 Id. at 612.
209 Id. at 613.
210 Id. at 612-13.
211 See id. at 615.
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demonstrating recognized stature through old newspaper articles
and unverified letters."212
The Carter test can be pushed too far.2 1 3 One court noted that
it "would be hard pressed to hold that a newly discovered Picasso
is not within the scope of VARA simply because it has not been
reviewed by experts in the art community." 214 However, this court
added that ordinarily it will not be enough for an artist to show
that some of his or her other creations have been highly
acclaimed. An artist's local notoriety may not be enough because
the focus is on the work that is the subject of the litigation, not on
the artist's general body of work.215 The provision's language
suggests that the work must have attained recognized stature at
the time it is destroyed, or at risk of being destroyed, and it
arguably follows that a work that has never been publicly
displayed cannot, as a matter of law, be of recognized statute. 216
This seems unduly harsh if it limits protection of a newly
discovered work by a recognized master, but this interpretation of
the requirement does give a court a way out of having to rule on a
difficult conflict between an artist and a property owner.
The "it cannot have recognized stature if no one has seen it"
interpretation was critical to the decision in Scott v. Dixon.217 This
case presents another sharp conflict between moral rights and
property rights. The plaintiff was an artist in Suffolk County, New
York, who had gained some local notoriety by creating a tall
212 Id. at 616.
213 See generally supra note 196 (stating the Carter test for determining whether a
work is of recognized stature has been cited, quoted, and used by other courts). The test
makes sense. However, it is important to remember that the Second Circuit ultimately
held in Carter that the art in question fell outside of VARA's coverage because it was a
work for hire. Similarly, the First Circuit in Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate did not
resolve whether the plaintiffs public sculpture park was of recognized stature because
it determined that VARA did not protect site-specific art.
214 Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
215 See id.; Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625, 631 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
216 Unless the work is known, the artist does not have a destruction claim. Pollara
v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 2003) (Gleeson, J.,. concurring) (quoting Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights
Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLuM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 477, 480 n. 19 (1990)). In this case a large banner was taken down and torn up
before it was displayed publicly. It had not achieved recognized stature according to
one of the judges.
217 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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sculpture (fifty-two feet high) called Stargazer Deer. It was made
of plywood over steel and located in a field so it was visible from a
county highway. Dixon asked the artist to create a work for the
backyard of his property so Scott created a massive swan,
fabricated out of steel. It was forty feet long and ten feet high. It
was delivered to Dixon's property, assembled there, and then
maintained by Dixon and his wife. Because their property was
surrounded by hedges twelve feet high this massive swan could
not be seen from the street, and Mr. and Mrs. Dixon never opened
their property for the general public to see the swan sculpture.218
Several years passed and the Dixons sold their property. The
sales contract required removal of the sculpture prior to closing.
Dixon testified that he told the plaintiff of his plans to remove the
sculpture, but the plaintiff testified to the contrary. In any event,
Dixon paid a company $5,400 to dismantle the swan and move it
to storage. There was some correspondence about moving the
sculpture to another location on Long Island or to a museum in
New England, but Dixon was not willing to absorb those costs. 2 19
The sculpture deteriorated because it was left uncovered and
could not be restored to its former condition. 220
The plaintiff claimed that her right to prevent destruction
had been violated. 221 The court determined that the plaintiff had
not presented sufficient evidence to establish that the swan was of
recognized stature and dismissed. It quoted the test from Carter222
and said that it is not sufficient that other works by the claimant
artist have achieved stature; "[i]nstead, it is the artwork that is
the subject of the litigation that must have acquired this
stature."223 The huge swan may have had artistic merit, but it was
not of recognized stature; it was not visible from the public street,
and the plaintiffs notoriety for her Stargazer Deer did not make
the swan a recognized work. In addition, the plaintiff did not call a
218 See id. at 397.
219 See id. at 398-99.
220 See id. at 399-400.
221 To prove this claim she had to show that the swan sculpture was a work of
recognized stature and that the defendant destroyed it in an intentional or grossly
negligent manner. See id. at 400 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) & Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
222 See id.
223 Id. (citing Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625, 631 (S.D. Ind. 1997)).
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witness to testify as to whether a member of the artistic
community had ever reviewed the swan, and the several
newspaper clippings regarding the massive deer did not prove
anything about the swan.2 2 4
2. "The modification of a work ... which is a result of the
passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials is
not" a violation of the integrity right 225 nor is the
"modification of a work . . . which is the result of
conservation, or of the public presentation, including
lighting and placement . . . unless the modification is
caused by gross negligence."226
Subsections 106A(c)(1) and (2) purport to account for
standard practices in the artistic community, as well as,
supplement the several exclusions in the definition of "work of
visual art."2 2 7 There is not a gross negligence exception for
modifications due to the passage of time or the nature of the
materials in (c)(1), unlike modifications caused by conservation
efforts or public presentation in (c)(2). In other words, if a work of
visual art is modified as a result of grossly negligent conservation
efforts, or as a result of gross negligence in its public presentation,
then that modification could violate the integrity right.228 On the
other hand, changes in a work of visual art due to a curator's
reasonable conservation efforts, or resulting from the way a
gallery owner or museum displays it do not violate VARA.229
Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine230 discusses and applies
both of these subsections. The plaintiff, Audrey Flack, is a well-
regarded artist who was commissioned to sculpt a statue of Queen
Catherine of Braganza, the namesake for the Borough of Queens.
This work, upon its casting in bronze, was to be installed on a site
224 See id. at 397.
225 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(c)(1).
226 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(c)(2).
227 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6927.
228 See id. See generally, Davis, supra note 22, at 217 (arguing that VARA's narrow
scope confers inconsistent and unpredictable protections over artworks such that even
the best practices of those who work to conserve art may jeopardize artists' rights).
229 See Davis, supra note 22, at 225-27.
230 See 139 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). This opinion is discussed in depth in
Davis, supra note 22, at 230-37.
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on the East River overlooking Manhattan. The artist completed
several phases of the project including making large maquettes
from which molds could be made for casting.231 The project became
controversial and the company that was doing the casting, Tallix,
terminated its work on the project until the commissioning entity
could make certain assurances. 232 Flack then discovered that her
clay sculpture of the statue's head had been left outside by Tallix
and damaged. She offered to reconstruct the damaged clay face for
an additional fee, but Tallix hired another artist to do this work.
In Flack's opinion, this second artist's work distorted the model,
making the facial features uneven and in the wrong size. Tallix
was about the cast the altered head in bronze when Flack sued,
alleging both copyright infringement and violations of VARA.233
Her VARA claims included partial destruction of a work of
recognized stature by placing the sculpted clay head outside,
hiring the second artist to reconstruct the face, and casting the
modified work without her approval.234 After conceding that
Flack's sculpted head was a protected work of visual art even
though it was still an unfinished model, 2 3 5 the court determined
that she had stated a claim as to how hiring the second artist to
work on the damaged face resulted in a distorted, mutilated model
that violated the integrity right. Her claim was outside the
protected conservation efforts limitation in (c)(2) because she had
made sufficient allegations to support an inference that the hiring
of the second artist was grossly negligent. 236
231 See 139 F. Supp. 2d at 529-30. The agreement from the commissioning party -
Friends of Queen Catherine (FQC) - called for Flack to be paid $125,000. See id. at
529. FQC contracted with Tallix, Inc. to fabricate the bronze sculpture. See id.
232 The public became aware that the Queen had profited from the slave trade. In
addition, the project had not gone through the appropriate review and approval
processes. See id. at 530-31.
233 See id. Tallix hired one of Flack's assistants to re-sculpt the face, and Flack felt
that he lacked the requisite skills for this job.
234 See id. at 531-32.
235 See id. at 532-34. "In the artistic community, 'models' such as the clay sculpture
are considered works of art in their own right. . . . such works are not 'models as used
in the exclusionary portion of the definition ..... Id. at 533-34. But see Elizabeth Bock,
Using Public Disclosure as the Vesting Point for Moral Rights Under the Visual Artists
Rights Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 153 (2011) (arguing that VARA protection should not
vest until the artist determines that his work is complete and presents it to the public).
236 See 139 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
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The court dismissed her claim that leaving the sculpted head
outside violated VARA by causing its partial destruction. It
explained that due to the language in section 106A(c)(1),
modification of a work due to the inherent nature of the materials
is not a violation of the integrity right even if the modification
results from gross negligence. 237 Moreover, the court rejected
Flack's contention that the sculpted head had been destroyed
because photos showed it was capable of being repaired and the
plaintiff had offered to repair it.238 The court also dismissed her
claim that VARA was violated when the defendant authorized
casting without her permission. According to the court, such a
claim could not be maintained under VARA because it mandates
the preservation of works, not the creation of works.239
Legislative history explains that the removal of a work from
a particular spot should generally come within the "public
presentation, including lighting and placement" exclusion
"because the location is a matter of presentation, unless the work
cannot be removed without causing the kinds modifications
described in . . . 106A(a)(3)." 240 Similarly, entities displaying
protected works "have normal discretion to light, frame, and place
works of art. However, conduct that goes beyond presentation ...
to physical modification of it is actionable."241 The public
presentation exception was reportedly crafted in response to the
"Tilted Arc" case, in which the artist Richard Serra sued the
General Services Administration for removing a massive work he
had done for Federal Square in lower Manhattan. 242 The Second
Circuit rejected his claim that removing this integrated, site
237 See id. at 534. See Davis, supra note 22, at 235-37 (critical of the court's handling
of this VARA claim in Flack's suit).
238 See 139 F. Supp. 2d at 534-35.
239 See id. at 535 (quoting Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 861 F. Supp. 303, 329
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
240 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6927.
241 Id. The legislative history, as an example, states that the public presentation
exclusion would protect an entity that "temporarily bedecked a sculpture of geese in
flight with ribbons at Christmas time." Id.; but see Snow v. Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70
C.P.R. 2d 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). Snow involved a successful claim by a Canadian
artist against a Toronto shopping mall that decorated his sculpture of geese in flight
with ribbons. This case is cited in VARA's legislative history after indicating that
putting ribbons on the sculpture would be allowed under the public presentation
exception. See also Bird, supra note 15, at 67-68.
242 See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 138 (1st Cir. 2006).
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specific, government owned work from government owned
property violated his due process and free exercise rights. 243 One
court has said that the premise of the public presentation
exception is:
artwork that can be moved in some fashion, such as paintings
or sculptures-that is, art that is not permanently affixed or
'integrated' in such a way that the mere act of moving it
would destroy it. The possibility of change without
destruction is implicit in the public presentation exception.
The public presentation exception defines the types of
changes, such as those in lighting and placement, that do not
constitute "destruction, distortion, or mutilation."244
3. The integrity right is "subject to the limitations set
forth in section 113(d)."245
Section 113(d) is called the buildings exception. It was
summarized briefly in the discussion of how Crimi, the 1949 case
involving the destruction of a fresco painted on the wall of a
church, might come out today.246 Section 113(d) sets forth a
general rule that creators of works incorporated into buildings are
protected by VARA and that when a building owner and artist
agree to the installation, the agreement extends to all subsequent
owners of the building. It also distinguishes between works of
visual art integrated into a building that can be removed and
those works that are incorporated in a structure in such a way
that they would be destroyed on removal.247
Under section 113(d)(1), a building owner's destruction of a
non-removable work will violate the integrity right unless the
artist (a) consented to the installation of the work of a building
before VARA's effective date on June 1, 1990, or (b) entered a
written agreement with the owner of the building, signed by both
of them, that installation of the work may subject it to destruction
by reason of its removal. This requirement insures that the artist
243 See Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussed in
Phillips, 459 F.3d at 138).
244 Phillips, 459 F.3d at 141.
245 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2012).
246 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
247 See H. REP., supra note 7, at 6930.
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is fully aware of the circumstances surrounding the installation
and understands that he is subjecting the work to "possible
modifications that otherwise would be actionable under section
106A."248
If the work is removable, and the owner of the building
wishes to remove it without violating the integrity right, then the
owner must (a) make a diligent, good faith attempt to notify the
artist of his or plans to remove the work from the building; if this
effort is not successful, the owner can remove the work, or (b) the
owner can remove the work if the artist, within ninety days of
receiving notice of the owner's plans in writing, fails to remove the
work or to pay for its removal. 249 According to legislative history,
this provision "presumes that an attempt to notify the author by
registered mail constitutes a diligent, good faith effort."250 These
subsections of 113(d), along with the public presentation exception
in section 106A(c)(2), "implicitly address" and simultaneously
reject the assertion "that the artist should have some control over
the framework" or context in which his work is incorporated. 251
Board of Managers of Soho International Arts Condominium
v. City of New York 252 is a drawn out battle over the removal of
artwork attached to steel reinforcement braces on an outer wall of
a twelve story loft building in New York City. The building, 599
Broadway, was erected in 1917.253 The art installation was
proposed in the early 1970s and paid for by City Walls, a non-
248 17 U.S.C. §§ 113(d)(1)(A), (B); H. REP., supra note 7, at 6930. Cf. Cohen v. G&M
Realty LP, No. 13-CV-5612(FB)(JMA), 2013 WL 6172732 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013)
(court refuses to preserve abandoned commercial buildings in order to protect graffiti
decorating the structures in part because the artists knew that their works would be
temporary because the building might be demolished).
249 See id. §§ 113(d)(2)(A)-(B). Congress separated works fitting the definition of
section 113(d) into two categories - removable and non-removable. Attlesey, supra note
27, at 385.
250 H. REP., supra note 7, at 6930.
251 Cf. Hughes, supra note 71, at 26.
252 No. 01 Civ.1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003). This is the
first of four rulings during several years of litigation. These ruling are discussed in
depth in Davis, surpa note 22, at 237-44. In the 1940s the city widened Houston Street
and in doing so, it destroyed most a building abutting 599 Broadway. As a result, 599
Broadway needed additional support so a system of 42 steel braces was installed. There
were seven rows of six evenly spaced braces with the lowest hanging 17 feet above the
street.
253 See Soho, 2003 WL 21403333 at *2.
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profit organization interested in enhancing the urban landscape.
It commissioned Forrest Myers to create and install the work. He
attached aluminum bars perpendicularly to the forty-two
reinforcement braces and then painted the braces, the
perpendicular bars, and the wall different colors.254
This wall and the attached artwork, referred to as "The
Wall," were repaired several times during the 1980s. Discussions
about removing the artwork led to the artist's strenuous protests
and did not go anywhere. In 1997, the artist was informed that
the wall needed to be repaired again, and that the artwork would
have to be removed. Myers responded through his attorney that
removal would violate VARA. Eventually, after a series of
meetings and hearings with various boards and commissions
lasting several years, the artwork was removed.255
The owners of the building sued Myers, the City, and the
Landmarks Preservation Commission seeking a declaratory ruling
that Myers had no rights under VARA because, under section
113(d)(1), this artwork was not removable, and the artist had
consented to its installation before VARA's effective date. Myers
counterclaimed, asserting that the work was removable without
destruction under section 113(d)(2), and that its permanent
removal constituted its destruction. 256 The court, in considering
254 See id. at *3-4. In the 1970s, a prior owner agreed to the installation of artwork
on the side of the building utilizing these steel braces. Various city commissions
approved the installation of the work. The City's Board of Estimate specifically stated
in 1973 that its consent would not endure longer than 10 years. While it is clear that
the building's owner consented to the installation of the work, few details of the parties'
agreements were put in writing.
255 See id. at *6. The owners sought permission from the Landmark Preservation
Commission to remove the work. See id. at *4-5. That body approved interim removal
of unstable braces along with the projecting sculpture in order to enable the owners to
address structural deterioration of the actual wall and "future reinstallation of the
sculpture, if feasible." Id. at *5. The commission also stated that "[any] proposal to
permanently eliminate portions, or the entirety, of the braces, sculpture or the
underlying masonry, will be reviewed at a Public Hearing for a Certificate of
Appropriateness." Id. The owner's next step was to seek permission for permanent
removal of the work. Public hearings were held during which the "Committee to Save
the Wall" fought for preservation of the "beloved Soho landmark." The commission
eventually denied the application in 2000, but in 2002 it apparently authorized the
repair work including removal of the artwork. There was disagreement over whether
the commission had conditioned removal and repair on the reinstallation of the work.
Id. at *6.
256 See id. at *8-10.
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cross motions for summary judgment on the VARA claims,
discussed section 113(d) at length, noted that it generally affords
lesser protection to removable than non-removable works, said
that if the art is removable, the building owner need only provide
the artist with notice, and if the artist fails to arrange for removal
then he loses his VARA rights; thus, allowing the owner to remove
the work. "However, for non-removable pieces, the premise is that
the artist does enjoy" integrity rights unless the installation
occurred with the artist's consent before VARA's effective date.2 5 7
The key issue boiled down to whether the artwork was
removable, and the court said that the record did not have any
evidence on this point.258 In discussing the parties' contentions,
the court explained, "there are no temporal adjectives modifying
'remove' in the statute such as 'temporary' or 'permanent.' As
such, it is clear that what Congress intended in bifurcating §
113(d)'s protection was to separate removal situations based not
on the temporality of the removal but on the consequences of the
removal."2 5 9 It added that the statute is not intended to preserve a
work of art where it is, but rather to preserve it as it is.260 The
court ultimately denied the cross motions for summary judgment
because the record lacked sufficient evidence about the
consequences of removing the artwork. 261
Several years later, following a bench trial in which the artist
and experts testified, the court held VARA protection was
unavailable because the Wall could not be removed without
destruction and the work was installed before VARA's effective
257 Id. at *9. See also Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Ams. Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620, 629
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Congress recognized that VARA modifies important understandings
and responsibilities between parties, and that it would be inappropriate to apply the
new standards to conduct occurring before VARA's effective date so alterations or
modification of a work before June 1, 1991 do not give rise to any rights under VARA).
258 See Soho, 2003 WL 21403333 at *9.
259 Id. at *10.
260 See id.
261 See id. See also Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of New York,
No. 01 Civ. 1226(DAB), 2003 WL 21767653 (S.D.N.Y July 31, 2003) (denial of cross
motions to reconsider the denials of the parties' summary judgment motions saying
that reconsideration of the work's removability was not warranted, if the work was
removable there were factual issues as to whether the property owner had fully
complied with section 113(d)(2), and that VARA made no distinction site-specific and
free standing works).
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date. Thus, the work fell within the ambit of section 113(d)(1).262
The artist argued that a work is not destroyed if it is capable of
being recreated, but he and his expert hurt their claim by stating
that the work had been "disbanded," which the court said was
synonymous with "destroy."263 Moreover, the court also said that
the original work as conceived and created by the artist in the
early 1970s had "metamorphosed" due to repainting by the artist
in 1981 and removal of the braces in 1997. As a result, the original
work no longer existed. The court said those changes by the artist
might have been sufficient to constitute destruction of the work.2 6 4
The court's suggestion that the work done to the Wall in 1981
and 1997 might have been sufficient to constitute destruction was
unnecessary in view of the court's determination that the complete
removal of art destroyed it. In addition, it would have been
reasonable to treat the 1981 and 1997 actions as reasonable
conservation efforts, instead of conduct that undermined the
artist's moral rights claim.2 6 5 The court's rejection of the artist's
argument that the artwork could be recreated was ultimately
undermined by the Wall's restoration to the building's north
side.266
The saga of the extended litigation over removal of the Wall
is another illustration of the problems associated with trying to
accommodate an artist's rights under VARA with our traditional
notions about the rights of property owners. More specifically, this
litigation underscores the need for persons who are commissioning
the creation of works of visual art that will be incorporated into
their buildings to have a written agreement with the artist, signed
262 See Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ.
1226(DAB), 2005 WL 1153752, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2005).
263 Id. at *3.
264 See id. See also Davis, supra note 22, 240-41 (highly critical of the court for
making these additional determinations). The court also ruled that the property
owners did not own the artwork, that the city could not force them to maintain the
work, and that if the city ordered restoration of the work, it would have to pay the
property owners fair compensation. See Soho, 2005 WL 1153752 at *12-13. See also
Ronda Kaysen, Effort to Save Soho Public Artwork Hits a Wall in Court, THE
VILLAGER, May 18-24, 2005; Davis, supra note 22, at 244 (the Wall was eventually
restored to the north side of the building and the building owners were able to use the
lower section of the wall for advertising).
265 See Davis, supra note 22, at 242-43.
266 See id. at 243-44.
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by the artist, spelling out what will happen in the event the owner
wants to remove the work. In addition, if the artist wants his or
her work to survive changes in the building's ownership or its
renovation without the costs and trauma of a lawsuit, then he or
she should consider making the work in a way that would permit
removal without its destruction.
IV. VARA AND SITE-SPECIFIC ART
Some artists create works for specific locations so that the
work's beauty, integrity, and aesthetic qualities are dependent on
how it is integrated with the property where it is located like a
city park or a town square. Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty in the
Great Salt Lake and Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial in
Washington, D.C. are examples. 267 In regard to works which are
integrated with their surroundings, some artists assert that
"[b]ecause the location of the work contributes to its meaning, site-
specific art is destroyed if it is moved from its original site."26 8
This assertion might also cover what is termed "conceptual
destruction" of the work: the artist's structure or installation can
be moved from its site intact, but its relocation to another site
conceptually destroys it.269
The fundamental question is whether site-specific art is
covered by VARA. As just discussed, the act distinguishes between
removable and non-removable works incorporated in buildings,
but "nowhere . . . does the statute make any legal distinction
between site-specific or free-standing works."2 7 0 Even though the
General Services Administration has commissioned many works
267 See Garson, supra note 27, at 234-36.
268 Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128,134 (1st Cir. 2006). A work
of "integrated art" is comprised of two or more objects that must be presented together
as the artist intended for the work to have its meaning and integrity. Id. In contrast,
"plop art" is a separately conceived art object that does not incorporate its
surroundings. Id. "The artists who create these works explain that the meaning and
purpose behind the art lie squarely within its physical location. They are clear that
relocation of the work destroys its meaning and purpose, obliterating its existence."
Garson, supra note 27, at 239.
269 Id. at 205. See generally, Hughes, supra note 71, at 23 (contending that
'framework control' takes artists' rights too far and that advocating for such rights
undermines efforts to gain acceptance of the core of moral rights).
270 Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ.
1226(DAB), 2003 WL 21767653, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2003).
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in public places since 1963, and notwithstanding the highly
publicized dispute over the removal of Richard Serra's site specific
'Tilted Arc' sculpture from Federal Plaza in lower Manhattan in
the 1980s, Congress failed to address artwork integrated with real
estate in VARA.271 If the legislation does apply to site-specific
works then the owner of land where a site-specific work is located
might be unable to remove it, absent a written waiver from the
artist.272
VARA's application to site-specific art was confronted head
on by the First Circuit in Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate.273
Eastport Park is on Boston's harbor. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc.
(Pembroke) leases the park from the Massachusetts Port
Authority and commissioned David Phillip, a renowned sculptor,
to help design the park.2 74 Phillips "created approximately twenty-
seven sculptures for the Park, comprised of fifteen abstract bronze
and granite pieces and twelve realistic bronze sculptures of
various aquatic creatures, including frogs, crabs, and shrimp."2 75
He was in charge of the design and installation of
stone walls, granite stones inlaid into the Park's walkways,
and other landscape design elements. Most of Phillips' work
in the Park is organized along the diagonal axis . . . at the
center of which is his large spherical sculpture entitled
'Chords', the centerpiece of the Park, which Phillips
personally carved from granite. 276
Phillips designed and created a large bronze medallion to
adorn a circular granite path. He also selected and placed large
rough-cut stones in the park. "Phillips' work in the Park is unified
by a theme of spiral and circular forms."2 7 7
271 Garson, supra note 27, at 205-06, 220-21. See also Hughes, supra note 71, at 28-
29 (discussing the Tilted Arc litigation).
272 Cf. Garson, supra note 27, at 206, 240 (asserting that section 113(d) needs to be
amended to include a waiver clause because courts should find that removing a site-
specific work from its context destroys the work and violates VARA).
273 See 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2006).
274 See id. at 129-30. The port authority has authority to approve changes in the
park's design.
275 Id. at 130. Three other artists also crafted art for the park. Id.
276 Id. at 130-31.
277 Id.
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A couple years after this nautical themed sculpture park was
completed, Pembroke decided that it wanted to redesign it.
Pembroke hired another landscape artist to do this work, hoping
to simplify walkways, remove much of the original stone, add
more plants, and remove or relocate many of Phillips' sculptures.
After Phillips objected, Pembroke agreed to retain his rough stone
walls and keep all but one his sculptures, but there were still
substantial changes in the original design. Unhappy with this
redesign, Phillips sought an injunction under VARA and the
Massachusetts Art Preservation Act (MAPA) to stop Pembroke
from making the changes. 278
A temporary restraining order was granted and then
Pembroke announced its intention to implement the original
redesign plan, which would move most of Phillips' work from the
park.279 Following an evidentiary hearing, the court held that
even though Phillips' work constituted an integrated work of
visual art, the free standing sculptural works could be moved and
that the multi-element, integrated work of art along one axis could
be disassembled and moved piecemeal so long as the individual
pieces were not altered or modified. 280 The court based this result
in large part on VARA's public presentation exception, stating "an
artist has no right to the placement or public presentation of his
sculpture under the exception in § 106Ac(2)." 281
Even though Phillips' VARA claim was unsuccessful, he
prevailed on his claim under the state's art preservation statute.
The district court, relying on MAPA's broad protections for site-
specific art, granted a preliminary injunction preventing
Pembroke from altering the park.2 8 2 This success was, however,
278 Phillips was claiming that the removal of any or all of his work from the park
would violate VARA by destroying or mutilating his work. See id. at 134. He argued
that all of his sculptural works in the park were once integrated work so that removal
of any one piece would destroy the whole. Cite? More importantly, he argued that all of
his pieces were site-specific, either individually or as one integrated work. See id. Site-
specific artwork is designed specifically for the location where it is to be placed.
"Essentially, for site-specific art, the location of the work is an integral element of the
work. Because the location of the work contributes to its meaning, site-specific art is
destroyed if it is moved from its original site." Id.
279 See id.
280 See id.
281 Id.
282 See id. at 131-32.
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short lived because the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
subsequently ruled on a certified question from the federal district
court that 1VIAPA did not protect site-specific art.2 83 In light of this
ruling, and its earlier determination that Phillips' sculptures
could be removed from the park due to VARA's public presentation
exception, the federal district court vacated the injunction and
entered judgment for Pembroke. Phillips appealed to the First
Circuit.284
The Court of Appeals stated that the district court purported
to protect site-specific art under VARA while permitting its
destruction under the public presentation exception. According to
the appellate panel, this was not a sensible reading of VARA. It
either did or did not apply to site-specific art. 2 8 5 Phillips contended
that site-specific and integrated art was covered by VARA, but
that the public presentation exception did not permit the removal
of such works. His pivotal question was "does the word placement
[in the exception] include something that is securely fixed in a
particular position as in the case . . . [of his] integrated work of
visual art . . . ?"286 The public presentation provision states: "The
modification of a work of visual art which is the result of
conservation, or of the public presentation, including lighting and
placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation,
or other modification described in subsection (a)(3) unless
modification is caused by gross negligence." 287
The court agreed with Phillips that the premise of this
exception is artwork that can be moved in some fashion, such as
paintings and sculptures. The work is not permanently fixed in a
way that the act of moving it destroys it.288 The court did not,
however, agree with his contention that the exception applied only
to "plop art" and not to site-specific, integrated works. The court
was unwilling to interpret VARA as creating a kind of "dual
regime." The statute made no reference to site-specific or
integrated art and provided no guidance for distinguishing such
283 See id. at 132 (citing Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 819 N.E.2d 579
(Mass. 2004).
284 See id. at 132.
285 See id. at 140.
286 Id. at 141.
287 17 U.S.C. § 106Ac(2) (2012).
288 See Phillips, 459 F.3d at 141.
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works from "plop art." In essence, if Congress wanted special
protection for site-specific art, VARA would have addressed the
issue. Moreover, accepting the plaintiffs dual regime argument
would be a virtual rewriting of the statute with far-reaching
effects. 289 "Once a piece of art is considered site-specific, and
protected by VARA, such objects could not be altered by the
property owner absent consent of the artist. Such a conclusion
could dramatically affect real property interests and laws."2 90
The court underscored this point by quoting Pembroke Real
Estate's brief:
[N]ot only would Pembroke's ability to move [Phillips'] work
or alter Eastport Park be subject to Phillips' approval,
but also the owners of nearby property who had nothing to do
with the purchase or installation of Phillips' works would be
subject to claims that what they do with their property has
somehow affected the site and has, as a result, altered or
destroyed Phillips' works. 291
The court noted that similar concerns about affording artists
rights that would encumber private and public property led the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to refuse to extend
MAPA to site-specific art.2 9 2 It also quoted the United States
Supreme Court's emphasis on the principle that "statutes which
invade the common law are to be read with a presumption
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles,
except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."293 The
First Circuit concluded "VARA does not apply to site-specific art at
all."294
This conclusion is not inevitable. In extended dicta in the
Kelley decision, the Seventh Circuit stated VARA's definition of a
"work of visual art" does not explicitly or by implication exclude
289 See id. at 140-42.
290 Id. at 142.
291 Id. (alteration in original).
292 See id. (discussing Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 819 N.E.2d 579, 584-
85 (Mass. 2004)).
293 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534
(1993)).
294 Id. at 143.
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site-specific art from protection.295 It added that the public
presentation exception does not "eliminate every type of protection
VARA grants to the creators of site specific art."2 9 6 The court
asserted that the First Circuit's all-or-nothing approach to site
specific art was not warranted because such works, though
modified if moved, are not necessarily destroyed when moved. 297
Moreover, the creator of a site-specific work of visual art should
enjoy his or her attribution right as well as integrity rights
against having the work "defaced and damaged in ways that do
not relate to its public display."2 9 8 Finally, section 113(d), dealing
with works that have been incorporated in or made part of a
building, covers a kind of site-specific art and "suggests that site-
specific art is not categorically excluded from VARA."299
One take-away from Philips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., as
well as Kelley v. Chicago Park District, for any individual or
organization commissioning a major installation on their real
estate which could be regarded as an integrated work of visual art
or site-specific art, is to reach an understanding with the artist
about removal and put that understanding in writing. Even
though VARA does not address site-specific art directly, the
statute's provision on works of visual art incorporated in or made
part of a building, section 113(d), provides guidance for how the
property owner and the artist can protect their respective rights
and interests.300
295 Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 306 (7th Cir. 2011) (the court
acknowledged that it did not have to resolve the several issues surrounding site-
specific art and the application of VARA's public presentation and building exceptions).
See also supra notes 165-88 and accompanying text (generally discussing the Kelley
decision).
296 Kelley, 635 F.3d at 306.
297 See id. at 307; see also Jackson v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., No. 11-4023-CV-
C-MJW, 2011 WL 5838432, at *4 (W.D. Mo. May 15, 2011) (noting that Kelley calls
into question the interpretation of VARA not applying to site specific art), vacated,
2012 WL 3166654 (W.D. Mo. May 15, 2012).
298 Kelley, 635 F.3d at 307.
299 Id. The city had argued that the 113(d) building exception applied because
Wildflower Works accommodated air vents for a parking garage but the court said this
was a stretch because being on top of a garage is not the same as being incorporated in
or made part of the garage. See id. at 307 n.8.
3oo See also Hughes, supra note 71, at 26, 36-38 (discussing section 113(d)
specifically and then some of the general problems associated with protecting site
specific public art).
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V. A FINAL LESSON ON ALWAYS GETTING IT IN WRITING!
The First Circuit, following its 2006 ruling against VARA
protection for site-specific art in Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate,
Inc., decided another major VARA case in 2010, when it held in
Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v.
Buchel that the statute protected a huge, unfinished museum
installation. 301 Even though this was not the first case to decide
VARA extended to unfinished works of visual art, 302 this heated
and publicized dispute provides several other lessons about
protecting moral rights.303 Also, it is fair to think of this litigation
as one of the rare reported artist victories under VARA. However,
it was a small victory because the court did not go as far as the
artist would have liked in protecting his moral rights.
The Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art includes
an exhibition space the size of a football field. Its ambitious goals
include "catalyz[ing] and support[ing] the creation of new art,
expos[ing] its visitors to bold visual and performing art in all
stages of production" and striving to "make the whole cloth of art
making, presentation and public participation a seamless
continuum." 304
Christoph Buchel is a Swiss artist with a reputation for
elaborate and huge politically provocative works through which
viewers can wander and even crawl. He visited the Boston
museum's facility in 2005, discussed a major project, and at some
point, proposed to do an installation titled "Training Ground for
Democracy" that the museum agreed to prepare and exhibit. In
August 2006, he spent ten days at the museum preparing a model
of the installation, and the museum agreed to purchase the
materials and items needed for the project. However, nothing was
301 See 593 F.3d 38, 65 (1st Cir. 2010).
302 See supra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
303 See Buchel, 593 F.3d at 41.
304 Id. at 42. The museum offers artists the time to create works of scale and
duration "impossible to realize in the time and space-cramped conditions of most
museums" that will expose people to "all stages of art production: rehearsals,
sculptural fabrication, and developmental workshops are frequently on view, as are
finished works of art." Id. (quotes are from the museum's mission statement).
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put in writing and the specifications, scope, and cost of the
installation were never spelled out.3 0 5
The museum's investment in this exhibition was substantial,
but over time its working relationship with Buchel deteriorated,
communications broke down, and the project was never
completed. 306 In May 2007, the museum announced that Buchel's
"Training Ground" exhibit was cancelled and that a new exhibit
was opening titled "Made at MASS MoCA." In order for patrons to
see this new exhibit, they had to walk through the space where
Buchel's unfinished installation was housed, covered with yellow
tarpaulins. 307 At the same time, the museum sued for declaratory
relief under VARA, seeking a ruling that it was entitled to show
Buchel's unfinished work. The artist counterclaimed, asserting
that the museum had violated his rights under VARA and the
Copyright Act. He sought to enjoin the museum from publicly
displaying his unfinished work.308 He also sought moral rights
damages caused by the museum's intentional distortion and
modification of his work of art and by allowing the public to see
and walk through his unfinished installation.3 0 9
The district court ruled from the bench in the museum's favor
after cross motions for summary judgment. It said that nothing in
VARA prevented the museum from showing an incomplete project
so long as it posted a disclaimer informing the viewing public that
306 See id. at 42-43. The project was supposed to be completed by December 2006.
Anandashankar Mazumdar, Appeals Court Vacates Summary Judgment Against
Installation Artist Christoph Buchel, 79 BNA P.T.C.J. 402 (Feb. 5, 2010). The project
was to be Buchel's largest venture to date. He saw it as "essentially a village . . .
containing several major architectural and structural elements integrated into a whole,
through which a visitor could walk (and climb)." Buchel, 593 F.3d at 42-43.
306 See Buchel, 593 F.3d at 43-44; Mazumdar, supra note 305, at 402. See also,
Monica Pa, Mass MOCA v. Buchel: The Creation Debate, LANDSLIDE, July/Aug. 2010,
at 54 (ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law 2010) (explaining the museum kept
working on the project, following the artist's instructions, "and even toyed with the
idea of completing the installation itself, calling it 'Mass MOCA interprets Buchel'").
See also Buchel, 593 F.3d at 43-46 (describing everything which transpired while the
relationship deteriorated).
30 See Buchel, 593 F.3d at 45-46.
30 See id. at 46; Pa, supra note 306, at 54. In particular, the museum wanted a
declaration that it was "entitled to present to the public the materials and partial
constructions assembled in connection with an exhibit planned with the Swiss artist
Buchel." Buchel, 593 F.3d at 46.
309 Buchel, 593. F.3d at 46; Mazumdar, supra note 305, at 402.
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the assembled materials "constitute[d] an unfinished project that
did not carry out the installation's original intent."310 Shortly
thereafter, the museum announced that it would be removing the
exhibit, and that it would no longer permit the public to enter the
installation. A couple months later, the district court issued a
written opinion stating, in essence, that when an artist agrees to
the creation, installation, and fabrication of a work of art on
someone else's property, with the actual installation and
fabrication of the work handled by someone else's staff, at
someone else's expense, and following someone else's suggestions;
then nothing in VARA or the Copyright Act gives that artist the
right, when things go wrong in that relationship, to specify what
is done with what is left behind so long as that someone else does
not label what is left behind as the artist's work. 311 In addition,
the district court questioned whether VARA applied to all
unfinished works and said that an artist seeking protection for an
unfinished work had to demonstrate violation of one of VARA's
rights with "special clarity."312 In short, the trial court ruled in the
museum's favor on its declaratory judgment action and denied all
of Buchel's counterclaims. 3 13
The First Circuit had no difficulty concluding that VARA
applied to unfinished works. It explained that VARA is part of the
copyright statute, that copyright protection attaches when a work
(or a portion of a work prepared over a period of time) is fixed in a
tangible medium of expression, and it was not surprising that
other courts had held that copyright protection extends to
unfinished works.314 Accordingly, it was appropriate to read VARA
as protecting unfinished works of art that would, upon completion,
310 Id. at 46-47. The court denied Buchel's request for injunctive relief and stated
that it would issue a detailed memorandum opinion in the coming weeks. The parties
did not dispute that Buchel's installation was a sculpture that qualified as a work of
visual art under VARA. See id. at 48 n.7.
311 See id. at 47 (citing Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel,
565 F. Supp. 2d 245, 248-49 (D. Mass. 2008), affd in part, vacated in part, and
remanded, 593 F.3d at 38). This statement arguably suggests that the museum could
be considered a co-creator of the project - a joint author. The First Circuit rejected the
co-creation argument. See Pa, supra note 306, at 54.
312 Buchel, 593 F.3d at 50 (quoting Buchel, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 258). See also
Mazumdar, supra note 305, at 402-03.
313 See Buchel, 593 F.3d at 47.
314 See id. at 51.
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qualify under the statute. The court said this conclusion was
based on the statute's plain language so it was unnecessary to
turn to VARA's legislative history.315 Still, that history supported
the court's reading of the statute as did common sense and the
fact that the history of art is full of highly acclaimed unfinished
works.316
Since Buchel enjoyed protection under VARA for his partially
completed installation, the court of appeals had to review the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the museum on its
alleged violations of his attribution and integrity rights. After an
extended discussion of the differences between VARA's provisions
on these two moral rights, the court agreed with "Nimmer's
surmise that VARA does not provide a damages remedy for an
attribution violation. Where the statutory language is framed as a
right 'to prevent' conduct, it does not necessarily follow that a
plaintiff is entitled to damages once the conduct occurs."317 In
addition, the court said it was "noteworthy that Congress created
a damages remedy for the destruction of a work of recognized
stature that is narrower than the right to prevent destruction of
such works. . . . This narrowing further indicates that Congress
did not intend a damages remedy to arise automatically from the
right to prevent conduct."318 Accordingly, Buchel did not have a
claim for damages caused by the museum's alleged violation of his
attribution right, and any basis for injunctive relief had been
eliminated by the museum's dismantling of the installation
thereby, preventing any more use of his name.319
The court concluded that one of Buchel's integrity claims
should have withstood the museum's summary judgment motion.
Specifically, the museum had disregarded his instructions by
continuing to work on the project and this may have resulted in
modifications in violation of VARA. The court said that there was
sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could find that
the museum's continued work on the project was detrimental to
315 See id.
316 See id. at 51-52. See also Mazumdar, supra note 305, at 403.
317 Buchel, 593 F.3d at 55.
318 Id. at 55-56. "Congress may have concluded that artists could obtain adequate
relief for the harms of false attribution by resorting to the Copyright Act and other
traditional claims." Id. at 56.
319 See id. at 56, 63.
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Buchel's honor and reputation.320 On the other hand, the court
affirmed the grant of summary judgment against Buchel's other
integrity claims. It said that covering the art with tarps might
have been disparaging, but this was not an intentional act of
distortion or modification. 3 2 1 Similarly, the museum's showing of
the unfinished work without Buchel's authorization could not be
treated as intentional distortion. It added that the unauthorized
exhibition of the work implicated the moral right of disclosure or
divulgation, but emphasized that the United States, unlike most
European countries, had not provided this particular moral right
in VARA.322
The saga of Mass MoCA and Christoph Buchel teaches
several lessons about VARA. First, the court of appeals held,
consistent with earlier rulings by other courts, that unfinished
works of visual art are protected by VARA. The statute does not
exclude unfinished works. Moreover, VARA is part of the
Copyright Act, which has been interpreted to afford protection to
unfinished works that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression. 323 Second, VARA does not provide a damages remedy
for violations of the attribution right but the artist can seek
injunctive relief to assert or disclaim authorship. 324 Third, in order
to recover for violation of the integrity right, the artist must show
that any distortion, mutilation, or modification of the work is
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and this prejudice
has to be shown for both injunctive relief and damages. 325 Fourth,
the intentional modification of a work of visual art in disregard of
an artist's specific instructions might harm an artist's honor and
reputation; and thus, give rise to a viable claim for a violation of
the integrity right.326 Fifth, covering a work of visual art
temporarily so that the public cannot see it, is not an intentional
act of distortion or modification in violation of the integrity
320 See id. at 57-61.
321 See id. at 61-62.
322 See id. at 62. However, the museum's unauthorized exhibition of Buchel's work
may have violated his public display right under section 106(5) of the Copyright Act.
323 See id. at 50-52. But see also Bock, supra note 235, at 170-72.
324 See Buchel, 593 F.3d at 55.
325 See id. at 54.
326 See id. at 57-61.
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right.327 Sixth, since VARA does not provide a right of disclosure,
the unauthorized display of a work of visual art is not a violation
of VARA. However, this conduct may constitute a violation of the
artist's public display right under the Copyright Act.328 Finally,
the most practical lesson from this saga is to get it in writing. The
court of appeals stated at the outset that:
[T]his case . . . may well serve as 'the ultimate how-not-to
guide in the complicated world of installation art.' . . .
Unfortunately, the parties never memorialized the terms of
their relationship or their understanding of intellectual
property issues involved in the installation in a written
agreement. Even more unfortunately, the project was never
completed.329
CONCLUSION
The Visual Artists Rights Act, as enacted by Congress in
1990, recognized moral rights for the first time and might have
brought our copyright law into compliance with Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention. However, it is a narrow statute with several
exclusions from coverage. For example, VARA affords protection
only to works of visual art, which are defined restrictively. It
protects only a select group of artists. Works of visual art created
by employees in the scope of their employment fall outside of
VARA because of the act's exclusion of works made for hire. The
law grants the two most important moral rights; the integrity and
attribution rights, but none of the other moral rights recognized in
many other countries. It permits creators of protected works to
waive their moral rights, and it limits protection to the life of the
artist instead of the copyright term of life plus 70 years. 330 The
statute's language and its legislative history make it clear that
Congress intended to limit its application. 331 It is no wonder that
327 See id. at 61.
328 See id. at 62-64.
329 Id. at 41. See also Pa & Robinson, supra note 14, at 27 (discussing VARA best
practices).
330 See supra notes 16-48 and accompanying text.
33 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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doubts were raised whether VARA, as enacted, fulfilled our
obligations under article 6bis of the Berne Convention.332
There also is no doubt that the federal judiciary, in
interpreting and applying VARA, has effectuated legislative
intent, and, at the same time, shown that those persons who
expressed doubts about our compliance with article 6bis were
correct. This article discusses and analyzes most of the reported
decisions that have interpreted and applied VARA.333 In the vast
majority, the artist's integrity right is implicated, and it is rare to
find a victorious artist in these reported decisions. 334 One artist
win that stands out is the Seventh Circuit decision affirming the
award of damages to Jan Martin for the destruction of his
sculptural work of recognized stature by the City of
Indianapolis. 33 5 An artist won a small battle when the First
Circuit ruled that Christoph Buchel stated a viable integrity right
claim against the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art in
alleging that the museum's continued work on his massive
unfinished installation without his permission was detrimental to
his honor and reputation.336 These decisions are not, however,
landmark wins for the community of visual artists. The Martin
litigation could have been avoided entirely had the City of
Indianapolis lived up to its agreement with the artist so he could
dismantle the sculpture, and perhaps many of the disputes
between Buchel and the museum could have been avoided through
a written agreement. These two cases support a basic point made
throughout this article; it is best to put expectations and
understandings in a written agreement, signed by the artist and
the party commissioning or purchasing the work of visual art.3 3 7
332 See Damich, supra note 12, at 947-48 (pointing out how the legislation fell short
of full compliance with 6bis in four areas). See generally supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
333 See generally Bird, supra note 15, at 64, 69 (noting that there are not many
reported decisions).
334 But see Pa & Robison, supra note 14, at 26-27 (discussing substantial
settlements in several disputes in California over damages to sculpture and murals).
3 See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 609 (7th Cir. 1999).
336 See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 57-61
(1st Cir. 2010).
337 This is not a new recommendation about the best way of deal with an artist's
rights under VARA. See Pa & Robinson, supra note 14, at 27-28 (discussing best
practices under VARA).
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Aside from these decisions, visual artists do not seem to have
fared well in the courts. The vast majority of the trial and
appellate decisions reported since the passage of VARA
substantiate the arguments made years ago that this is a weak
and anemic statute that does not fulfill our obligation to comply
with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.338
Even though VARA's attempt to accommodate moral rights
with our copyright law has not resulted in major victories by
visual artists, there are some scholars who want to expand moral
rights protection in the United States to cover additional
categories of works of authorship and the creators of those works
including performers, film directors, and literary authors.339 There
are, of course, scholars making strong arguments against moral
rights and against expanding protection in the United States. 340
The doctrine continues to attract considerable attention in the
academy. In fact, one scholar noted that the number of journal
notes and law review articles on moral rights and VARA far
exceeds the number of published legal disputes on those topics. 341
Notwithstanding the passage of VARA over twenty years ago, the
moral rights doctrine remains a relatively foreign concept in
American law3 42 that does not fit nicely with our copyright law
and our established notions about the rights of owners of real and
personal property. The rhetoric surrounding the enactment of
VARA promised more than Congress delivered.
338 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
33 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 596-97; see also supra notes 16, 17, 20. See
generally ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010); Bird, supra note 13; Tanja Makovec
Petrik, Moral Rights of Composers: The Protection of Attribution and Integrity
Available to Musicians in the European Union and the United States, 22 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 359 (2011); Zemer, supra note 1.
340 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 265; Carter, supra note 44, at 100-01; Gorman,
supra note 15, at 422; Mills, supra note 14, at 444; Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights:
Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789, 822 (2007).
341 Bird, supra note 15, at 64 n.8.
342 Bird, supra note 13, at 414-15.
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